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ABSTRACT 
There is widespread consensus among both policymakers and intelligence 
professionals that domestic counterterrorism efforts remain hampered by the lack of an 
effective national intelligence network that fully integrates the Homeland’s entire 
intelligence assets and other related Homeland Security capabilities into one national 
counterterrorism system.  The failure to unify our domestic counterterrorism efforts 
inhibits timely and complete information sharing and the evolution of a more robust 
Homeland Security prevention and response capacity. 
To achieve counterterrorism synergy we need a holistic approach that removes the 
intelligence element from its vacuum and fuses it in the counterterrorism crucible, along 
with the investigations element and related Homeland Security prevention and response 
operational elements, in Regional All-Hazards, Disaster and Anti-Terrorism Resource 
(R.A.D.A.R.) centers. These regional and super-regional R.A.D.A.R. centers can then be 
united into a National Counterterrorism Network under the auspices of the National 
Counterterrorism Center and the National Operations Center. Fusing this multi-
government level, multi-disciplinary collaboration of intelligence, investigative and 
operational assets, along with the resources of key private sector groups into one unified 
organism would eliminate information sharing barriers, and will ensure the most efficient 
and effective use of Homeland Security resources to prevent and respond to terrorist 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, it is understandable that we would 
experiment with a myriad of new counterterrorism architecture designed to overcome the 
defects in our national framework that led to the successful attacks. It is also 
understandable that much of the new structures would be hastily constructed because the 
exigency of the situation demanded we quickly develop solutions to shelter the 
Homeland.  Nonetheless, almost six years later, in the rush to solve the problems 
identified by the 9/11 Commission and others, not enough time and other resources have 
been devoted to an inspection of the effectiveness of the pre and post 9/11 counter-
terrorism structures to ensure that our counterterrorism and Homeland Security organisms 
have adapted and evolved to where they need to be. 
There is a consensus that, while we have improved information sharing and 
intelligence analysis, there are still enormous gaps in these and other aspects of our 
national counterterrorism strategy. Moreover, the ever-growing number of new 
counterterrorism organizations, such as fusion centers, is consuming an ever-increasing 
amount of likely decreasing Homeland Security dollars and resources. In terms of 
counterterrorism, we are also well beyond the “alarmed discovery and euphoric 
enthusiasm” stage of the issue-attention cycle. We have been through the shock and awe 
of “realizing the cost of significant progress.” We have felt the “gradual decline of public 
interest,” and we are now firmly settled into the prolonged limbo of the “post-problem 
stage,” where counterterrorism only sporadically captures the national interest.1 This 
environment thus cries out for a retrospective examination.  It is now time to take stock 
of the strengths and weaknesses of what has evolved, including the newest 
counterterrorism progeny, fusion centers.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For an explanation of the issue attention cycle by its author, see Anthony Downs, Political Theory 
and Public Choice (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998), 100-112. 
2B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will attempt to answer several questions:  What is the current state of 
our domestic counterterrorism efforts? Are the Joint Terrorism Task Force and Fusion 
Center models fine-tuned enough for the domestic threat environment?  Alternatively, is 
there something still missing in the gene pool of our Homeland Security organisms?  Is 
future development of a unified model feasible or desirable? Intertwined with this 
question, how well are we addressing the subsets of intelligence, investigations, and 
operations?  
The research questions are further focused on finding out what entities should be 
included in a potential National Counterterrorism Network (NCN), and how such a 
network would be constructed. For example, would “regionalizing” our approach produce 
better results?  If so, how might “a region” best be defined in geographical terms? Which 
disciplines or entities should be included, and how would the difficult task of governance 
be addressed? What are the implications for civil liberties and privacy? 
C. OBJECTIVES   
In studying current and proposed collaborative and single entity counterterrorism 
structures and networks, I will identify the positive and negative aspects that should lead 
to a “best practices” approach.  This best, or at least “smart,” practices approach will 
present policy options that can be applied to both improve existing entities and to aid in 
the creation of a National Counterterrorism Network.  
D. AUDIENCE 
The audience for this research includes the entities currently funding, overseeing 
or participating in domestic counterterrorism intelligence, investigations or operations, as 
well as those contemplating participating in or creating such organizations. This research 
will be applicable to all levels of government, federal, state, local and tribal, as well as a 
broad array of Homeland Security disciplines, including law enforcement, public health, 
fire, emergency management, private sector security and interested members of the  
 
 
3public. In particular, the Department of Homeland Security and others are searching for 
ways to vertically and horizontally integrate our disparate national counterterrorism 
resources, and this research will be especially relevant to that effort. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The significance of this research is that while we have made substantial progress 
since 9/11, there is a consensus that we are still not sharing information effectively, and 
there is considerable question as to the best model for conducting counterterrorism 
intelligence, investigations and operations. Since there is limited evidence that al Qaeda 
or any “organized serious group” has attempted further attacks against the United States 
on American soil, we don’t know if we have undertaken effective anti-terrorism 
measures, or if our systems simply have not been tested. Since it is a “pass-fail” system, 
we ought not to defer to al Qaeda to do the examination. We need to ensure we are not 
simply following a “check box” approach in having each state create a “fusion center,” 
and agencies participate in “joint terrorism task forces.” There is a need to identify 
remaining issues and potential solutions to ensure that these and other counterterrorism 
structures are maximizing our counterterrorism capacity.  
F. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will explore the following five central hypotheses in researching 
current and proposed domestic counterterrorism structures and systems.   
1)  Despite progress since 9/11, we have to continue to critically examine the 
efficacy of our current strategies in order to conclude whether there is 
evidence that our new domestic counterterrorism strategy is effective in 
preventing and responding to terrorism, or simply untested. 
When considering potential policy options that we can apply to our 
counterterrorism efforts, one of those options will be to maintain the status quo.  One can 
argue that since there have been no further attacks, our current systems are effective. 
Therefore, whether the lack of attacks is due to successful interdictions, or simply 
because al Qaeda has not decided to launch attacks is an important consideration. To the 
extent that we can answer this question, it would help determine to what extent our 
current structures are effective in preventing attacks. 
4On the other hand, if, if there is no evidence of an organized effort to launch 
serious attacks accompanying this time of domestic “tranquility,” we don’t know if our 
newly evolved counterterrorism structures to detect, prevent and interdict such attacks 
have the right adaptations. Because of the potential catastrophic consequences of a 
successful attack, e.g., a WMD attack, a critical examination of the strengths and 
successes, along with the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of our current efforts is 
imperative. To aid this examination, we need to consider both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. 
2) The integration of Intelligence with related Homeland Security 
components such as Investigations and Operations may have a synergistic 
effect on counterterrorism efforts that maximizes our nation’s prevention 
and response capacity 
Most of our current counterterrorism structures isolate the intelligence function in 
intelligence or fusion centers, separating intelligence from investigative components and 
operational elements. For example, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is primarily an 
investigative group, operating under a different command structure and organization than 
most fusion centers, which focus primarily on intelligence. Both fusion centers and 
JTTF’s are separated physically and organizationally from most operational components, 
such as first responders.  If we combine these three counterterrorism elements, the 
resulting synergy should provide substantial benefits such as timelier sharing of 
information from intelligence components to operational components, more efficient 
targeting of investigative and operational resources based on intelligence needs and vice-
versa, etc.  
3) Our counterterrorism effectiveness will increase by adoption of a fully 
collaborative multi-level, multi-discipline effort. 
Even though nearly all participants and organizations pay homage at the altar of 
collaboration, the design of our counterterrorism structures may inhibit achieving the full 
benefits of a fully collaborative approach. A fully collaborative approach entails 
controversial concepts such as joint governance, joint decision-making, and resource 
sharing. Collaborations that are more fulsome will produce the necessary trust and 
relationships for more timely and complete information and resource sharing, and enable 
operational responses that are more effective. The research associated with this thesis will 
ascertain to what extent Homeland Security stakeholders feel their participation 
5comprises a true and effective collaboration, and identify barriers to more effective 
efforts among the various Homeland Security disciplines and levels of government. We 
will explore options that overcome these barriers. 
4) Regionalism within an “all-hazards” framework is a cornerstone to 
establishing effective counterterrorism centers. 
America has tens of thousands of political subdivisions, many of which have their 
own separate police, fire, health and other Homeland Security structures. Overlaying this 
morass is an increasing amount of disparate intelligence and counterterrorism structures 
such as fusion centers.  As a prerequisite to forming a National Counterterrorism 
Network, we need to organize the multitude of counterterrorism entities that exist, and 
continue to proliferate.  This is integral in order to share information and resources in a 
timely and complete fashion. It is also central to the successful application of every step 
of a national intelligence cycle.2 
Because of declining funding levels, a ubiquitous shortage of personnel, and 
desirable economies of scale and efficiencies, a regional, rather than a local or state 
approach, will likely be necessary to form the foundation of an effective national 
counterterrorism effort. Furthermore, we might best form and strengthen the partnerships 
and relationships integral to counterterrorism within the sandbox of “all-hazards” where 
Homeland Security stakeholders more commonly interact with each other. It is also more 
efficient to use existing structures, relationships and resources for both terrorism and 
other hazards when feasible. This thesis research will assist in defining considerations for 
identifying regional boundaries, regional partners, and potential organizational structures. 
5) Our “regionalized” structures need to be horizontally and vertically 
integrated under the auspices of a national counterterrorism network to 
ensure more effective information sharing, intelligence analysis, and 
coordination of investigations and operations. 
Despite progress in improving information sharing since 9/11, there are still 
enormous battles over turf, funding, and control.  This results in information silos, 
inefficient use of our limited counterterrorism resources, and a lack of coordination of 
investigative, intelligence and operational resources. Without some kind of national 
system or network, there is unlikely to be an effective way to overcome the long history 
                                                 
2 See Chapter III A.2. 
6of collaboration problems among legacy groups, such as the CIA, FBI, etc., as well as 
newcomers such as the DHS. The sovereign struggle between federal, state, tribal and 
local officials will also likely remain problematic without a structure to unite efforts into 
a national system. Moreover, even if a utopian vision of collaboration and harmony 
reigns in our regions, there will still be a need for a network structure to connect and 
coordinate the various regions.  
 
7II.  METHODOLOGY 
Homeland Security is a young enough field that it remains more art than science 
so I will assess the research hypotheses by several methods.  One will be by interviews of 
subject matter experts, augmented with my informed observation from several years as a 
Homeland Security and intelligence professional. There is also a wealth of published 
research and commentary on the various components of Homeland Security and 
counterterrorism to dissect and review. Additionally, there is available empirical data to 
determine the nature and extent of finished intelligence products we are producing.  
Finally, surveys of stakeholders, such as Homeland Security practitioners and  consumers 
of intelligence, exist that will also help to measure effectiveness of current systems by 
metrics such as work products received from various entities, satisfaction scales, and 
significant operational or investigative successes. 
To narrow the scope to a manageable level, this paper will also focus on the 
prevention side of the counterterrorism house, as compared with a preparation and 
response focus. In doing so, I will review intelligence and related anti-terrorism 
disciplines, such as operations and investigations, that appear to have a synergistic 
potential.  There is a substantial amount of scholarly literature, as well as editorial and 
policymaker analysis on this subject. I will supplement this written research with on-site 
visits and/or interviews of multiple counterterrorism (CT) entities and participants, 
including the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), the National 
Capital Region Intelligence Center, Illinois Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center 
(STIC), and the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC). 
I expect this approach to produce an understanding of and insight into the 
beneficial and detrimental aspects of our nation’s current counterterrorism efforts. The 
primary goal is to develop a smart/best practices foundation in order to provide the basis 
for policy recommendations to improve our domestic Homeland Security position. This 
will necessitate presenting an analysis of the primary problems identified in the post 9/11 
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9III. THE COUNTERTERRORISM CHALLENGE 
The nature of Homeland Security and its offspring of counterterrorism will likely 
always remain more an art than a science, but we still need to be rigorous in our 
examination of the domestic counterterrorism challenge.  One of the difficulties is the ad 
hoc nature of much of the counterterrorism process, where many parts have developed in 
isolation for specialized purposes without any coordinated policy or effort, e.g., the 
myriad of stand-alone intelligence groups in various jurisdictions. Other aspects of 
reform reflect a systemic effort, such as creating a Homeland Security Information 
Network. The objectives and appropriate metrics of each approach are very different.  
Another challenge in examining domestic counterterrorism efforts is that legacy 
effects of the larger counterterrorism arena, especially long-standing difficulties in the 
intelligence field, still impact newly created counterterrorism structures.   Therefore, in 
attempting to discern the strengths and weaknesses of our embryonic Homeland Security 
counterterrorism efforts, our examination can benefit from borrowing an analytical tool 
from the science of biology and applying an “evo-devo” approach to studying the 
effectiveness of our current Homeland Security efforts.  “Evo-devo” (or “evolutionary 
developmental biology”) emerged as a discipline in the late 1990’s and involves the 
scientific study of both the individual organism’s development and the evolution of the 
organism’s lineage to gain new insights. Evo-devo identifies the origin and evolution of 
embryonic development and describes how modifications of developmental processes 
lead to the production of new features and sometimes new organisms.  
Since our domestic counterterrorism effort is at an embryonic stage, still 
developing new features, but also carries the “genes” of previous structures and systems, 
that impact those new features, an “evo-devo” approach is well-suited for our 
examination. An “evo-devo” approach to Homeland Security would involve studying the 
evolution of key counterterrorism fields, such as intelligence, investigations and 
operations as well as the development of specific key “organisms,” such as the fusion 
centers and JTTF's. This approach would ideally provide the necessary insight to identify  
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not only the beneficial and detrimental traits in our current national, regional, and local 
counterterrorism efforts, but also the causes behind the development of these traits so that 
we can develop a model that corrects the flaws and replicates the strengths.  
Accordingly, our examination will include a review of the foundational elements 
or “genetic code” of the counterterrorism process, especially focused on intelligence and 
its cousin--information sharing. This will be followed by an assessment of how well 
counterterrorism organisms have adapted to their new environment, dissecting perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of our current reform efforts, particularly the nascent fusion 
center effort. Finally, we will scrutinize some possible evolutionary paths that may 
develop an even stronger domestic counterterrorism organism. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 
AND COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNITY  
Though the outward appearances vary, nearly all counterterrorism efforts share 
some common genetic material integral to understanding their resulting characteristics 
and potential. Highlighting and defining certain key aspects of intelligence and related 
anti-terrorism components is necessary for a thorough analysis in later chapters of how 
well America has adapted to the “new normalcy” as the Gilmore Commission describes 
our national threat environment after 9/11.3 This new normalcy acknowledges that the 
threat of terrorism will not disappear, and thus a critical examination is called for to 
ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of our domestic intelligence and counterterrorism 
community.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to present an exhaustive review of the entire 
national intelligence effort, or even to be a primer on intelligence.4 Instead, we will focus 
on examining the elements of the intelligence branch of the family counterterrorism tree 
that explain specific issues of controversy, or that lay a foundation for discussions in 
subsequent chapters regarding perceived weaknesses and gaps in our current reform 
efforts. For example, when we examine “information-sharing” problems, we need to 
                                                 
3 Gilmore Commission Report, Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, 
Protecting Our Liberty (Washington, DC: RAND, 2003).  
4 For an excellent in depth study of intelligence see Mark Lowenthal’s book Intelligence, From Secrets 
to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006). 
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understand the essential difference between “information” and “intelligence,” and we 
need to understand how privacy and civil liberties concerns have evolved along with the 
collection of intelligence and sharing of information. 
1. The Definitional Struggle   
There is no one definition of “counterterrorism,” or “anti-terrorism” as some 
observers refer to it. Counterterrorism forms one of the six critical mission areas of 
Homeland Security, and the term encompass a broad array of practices, tactics, and 
strategies that all levels of government and the public and private sector undertake to 
combat terrorism.5 Though some argue that “counterterrorism” implies a more aggressive 
posture, i.e., offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond in combating 
terrorism, than “anti-terrorism,” which can be thought of as defensive measures used to 
reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorist acts, the literature generally 
treats the terms synonymously, and they will be so used in this thesis 
What is “intelligence?” Definitions abound.  The National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NCISP) defines it as “information that has been analyzed to determine its 
meaning and relevance.”6 Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, Mark 
Lowenthal, makes some important points in this somewhat cumbersome but illuminating 
definition: 
Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information 
important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of 
these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and 
the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.7 
Notice that this definition makes the salient point that intelligence includes “the 
carrying out of operations….” This reinforces the discussion in the preceding sections in 
which the integration of intelligence components with operational components is posited 
                                                 
5 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002) 
viii–x, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (accessed December 14, 2006). 
6 United States. Department of Justice. National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Washington, DC: 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, October 2003), 28. Available at 
http://www.iir.com/global/products/NCISP_Plan.pdf (accessed January 19, 2007). 
7 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2002 [second edition]), 8. 
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as an essential aspect of the counterterrorism effort. This definition also makes clear that 
intelligence is both a product and a process. This process, discussed below, is known as 
the “intelligence cycle.” A basic understanding of the intelligence cycle is critical, as this 
cycle is what distinguishes two terms that are often mistakenly used interchangeably: 
“information” and “intelligence.”  
The distinction between “information” and “intelligence” is significant. Post-9/11, 
the mantra calling for “information-sharing” has led to distributing what Lisa M. 
Palmieri, President of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Analysts (IALEIA), calls “uncorroborated, unevaluated, ‘white noise,’” that can derail 
counterterrorism efforts by drowning out significant intelligence.8  Former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell is quoted as saying, “I don’t need news. I don’t need facts. I have a 
television. I have the Internet. I have a telephone. People tell me lots of facts. I need to 
know what it means, how important it is, what you think about it.”9 
Confusing information with intelligence can also lead to the phenomenon known 
as “circular reporting.” Circular reporting occurs when two or more collectors get 
information from the same source but report the information independently. This leads to 
the false confirming of information, or the false conclusion that there is a “pattern” of 
certain suspicious behaviors. 
The problem of circular reporting is particularly relevant to our discussion of the 
need for a National Counterterrorism Network that connects our ever-growing number of 
disparate fusion and intelligence centers, including the hypothesis that regionalizing our 
efforts within a national network is an important evolution.  It is also pertinent to the call 
for integration of a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency, collaborative approach in order to 
develop a more united and coordinated intelligence cycle. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Lisa M. Palmieri, Information vs. Intelligence: What Police Executives Need to Know, paper for 
IACP Annual Meeting, 2005. 
9 Thomas Fingar, quoting Colin Powell, conference presentation during The DNI’s Information 
Sharing Conference and Technology Exposition, Denver, CO, August 21, 2006. 
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2. The “Intelligence Cycle” 
The process of producing intelligence is commonly referred to as the “intelligence 
cycle.” The intelligence cycle is the method by which raw information is converted into 
intelligence and made available to the targeted consumers, including policymakers, 
military planners, and, in the case of criminal intelligence, investigators.  
There are six primary steps in the intelligence cycle: identifying needs and 
priorities, collecting information based on the identified needs, analysis, producing a 
finished intelligence product, disseminating that product, and getting feedback.  
 
 
Figure 1.   The Intelligence Cycle10  
 
I. Needs assessment: This is where the intelligence cycle both begins and 
is usually renewed. The intelligence cycle begins here because it involves determination 
of the intended consumers’ intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, 
and direction to the collectors and collection system of what to collect.11 It is also where 
the cycle begins anew because finished intelligence usually generates new requirements 
from the consumers who may have found the intelligence provided was insufficient. 
Alternatively, the finished intelligence product may have been useful, but further 
                                                 
10 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. “An 
Overview of the Intelligence Community” in the Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. 
Intelligence. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000). Available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/intelligence/int/int023.html (accessed January 17, 2007). 
11 These are also commonly referred to as Identified Intelligence Needs (IIN’s) or Identified 
Intelligence Requirements (IIR’s). 
14
intelligence needs have been identified. This needs/requirements stage focuses the next 
step--the collection of information. The consumers who drive this stage range from 
policymakers to individual investigators or operational users. As an example, the Director 
of National Intelligence (see below) issues the National Intelligence Priorities Framework 
(NIPF) to the federal intelligence community (IC)12 to provide guidance on the national 
intelligence priorities approved by the President. The NIPF is updated twice a year with 
input from the federal IC and is a classified document.  
There has been a post-9/11 epiphany that we need to move beyond a Cold War 
mentality regarding intelligence.  In her upcoming book on intelligence reform, UCLA 
Professor Amy Zegart writes, “the U.S. intelligence community showed a stunning 
inability to adapt to the rise of terrorism after the Cold War ended”… “The Cold War had 
dominated both the thinking and operation of the CIA and the 13 other agencies of the 
U.S. intelligence community.”13  
In changing the Cold War  mentality and adapting to our new threat environment, 
the nation’s intelligence needs and requirements need to be driven by not only the 
traditional federal intelligence community, the military and high level policymakers, but 
by the broader Homeland Security community. The Homeland Security community is 
larger than just federal law enforcement officials and the military.  It includes state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement, as well as such disciplines as Public Health, Fire Services, 
Utilities, Transportation, Emergency Management and Private Security. Changing our 
mentality therefore requires “opening the club” to groups and individuals that previously 
were locked out, since they were previously not seen as significant stakeholders, as either 
consumers or collectors of intelligence. As discussed in the next chapter, we are still 
struggling to move from the conceptual to the concrete in this arena. 
II. Collection: This step involves collection of raw information and transfer to 
analytical components for production of finished intelligence products.  It is at this stage 
                                                 
12 The term “Intelligence Community” is generally used to refer to the group of sixteen federal 
government agencies that have a recognized role in national intelligence, e.g., the CIA and FBI, and the 
term is used in this manner here; however, who or what should actually comprise the “Intelligence 
Community” is discussed throughout this thesis as a central point of concern. 
13 Amy Zegart, excerpt from an upcoming book to be published, Intelligence in Wonderland: 9/11 and 
the Roots of Failure, from an online article available at 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=31370 (accessed on December 4, 2006). 
15
that civil liberty or privacy concerns are usually raised concerning whether a particular 
collection technique, e.g., surveillance of international telephone calls, is constitutionally 
sound or is violative of a right such as the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement or the 
First Amendment’s protection of freedoms of expression.14 These concerns are explored 
further in subsequent chapters. There are five main ways of collecting intelligence, often 
collectively referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INT's.”  
 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information from human sources. The 
collection may be done openly, as when FBI agents interview witnesses or suspects, or it may be done 
through clandestine or covert means (espionage). Within the United States, HUMINT collection is the 
responsibility of federal, state, and local law enforcement. Beyond U.S. borders, HUMINT is generally 
collected by the CIA, but also by other U.S. components abroad.  
 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) refers to electronic transmissions that can be collected by ships, 
planes, ground sites, or satellites. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is a type of SIGINT and refers 
to the interception of communications between two parties. U.S. SIGINT satellites are designed and built 
by the National Reconnaissance Office, although conducting U.S. signals intelligence activities is primarily 
the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA). The FBI collects SIGINT through authorized 
wiretaps and other electronic intercepts of information. Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) is sometimes 
used to indicate data relayed by weapons during tests, while electronic intelligence (ELINT) can indicate 
electronic emissions picked up from modern weapons and tracking systems. Both TELINT and ELINT can 
be types of SIGINT and contribute to MASINT. 
 
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) is a relatively little-known collection 
discipline that concerns weapons capabilities and industrial activities. MASINT includes the advanced 
processing and use of data gathered from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems.  
 
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) comprises the exploitation and analysis of satellite information 
to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the 
Earth. GEOINT sources include imagery and is sometimes also referred to as imagery intelligence or 
IMINT or photo intelligence (PHOTINT). One of the earliest forms of IMINT took place during the Civil 
War, when soldiers were sent up in balloons to gather intelligence about their surroundings. It was 
practiced largely in World Wars I and II when both sides took photographs from airplanes. Today, the 
National Reconnaissance Office designs, builds, and operates imagery satellites, while the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is largely responsible for processing and using the imagery 
 
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to a broad array of information and sources that are 
generally available, including information obtained from the media (newspapers, radio, television, etc.), 
professional and academic records (papers, conferences, professional associations, etc.), and public data 
(government reports, demographics, hearings, speeches, etc.).  
Table 1.   The “INT’s” from FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence15  
                                                 
14 For a review of principal changes since 9/11 and the dangers they may pose, see Stephen J. 
Schulhofer. The Enemy Within: Intelligence Gathering, Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties in the Wake 
of September 11 (Washington, DC: Century Foundation Press, 2002). 
15 “‘INT’s’ – The Intelligence Collection Disciplines” Available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/intelligence/di_ints.htm (accessed November 12, 2006). 
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When it comes to collection, more is not necessarily better. At a recent 
intelligence conference, Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, called 
for systemic change in intelligence gathering and posited that U.S. intelligence collectors 
“have become vacuum cleaners on steroids,” resulting in enormous amounts of 
unanalyzed data.16 What's more, another speaker remarked that simply “placing more hay 
on the haystack doesn’t make finding the needles any easier”17   
III. Analysis:  Analysis is perhaps the most critical phase in the intelligence 
cycle as this stage involves taking the raw data or basic information and converting it into 
intelligence.  This “value added” process places the information in context, adds 
perspective, verification and corroboration. Finally, when it has been reviewed and 
correlated with information available from other sources, it is called “finished 
intelligence.”  
The explosion of new intelligence and analytical centers post 9/11 has fueled a 
huge demand for analysts, with the FBI alone adding over a thousand.  This demand, 
coupled with the high skill level needed for competent analysis, has created a significant 
shortage of qualified analysts, and this shortage is recognized as one of our major 
problems in addressing counterterrorism gaps.18 
IV. Production: Information has to be produced in a form useful to the 
consumer. Accordingly, this step includes preparation of a variety of finished intelligence 
products defined by the consumer’s needs, including single-source, event-oriented 
reports, such as intelligence bulletins, and longer term, all-source, finished intelligence 
studies, such as strategic intelligence assessments. 
V. Dissemination: Dissemination is the process of actually distributing a 
finished intelligence product to the intended consumers. This process involves both the 
technical means to distribute the product, such as using secure web based networks, 
faxes, telephones, etc., as well as the restrictions placed on who can receive the 
intelligence. Intelligence agencies must balance the need to share sensitive information, 
                                                 
16 Bruce Finley, “Intelligence Fixes Floated at Conference” Denver Post, August 22, 2006. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “Intelligence Agencies Face Staff Shortage” USA Today, December 27, 2004. 
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including terrorism-related information, with the need to protect it from too widespread 
of an audience that might endanger sources, expose methods, or otherwise inhibit a 
counterterrorism operation or investigation.  
To protect sensitive sources and methods, intelligence is distributed according to 
two basic tenets: the “need to know” (Does the recipient have a legitimate reason to 
receive the information?) and the “right to know” (Does the law allow the recipient to 
receive the information?). Additionally, legal restrictions involving the “classifying” of 
information may require a special security clearance to receive certain information. 
Dissemination issues are explored more fully in Chapter V. 
VI. Feedback: This step is frequently omitted from discussion but it is 
essential in ascertaining whether the product disseminated met the identified needs or 
whether gaps or new needs were identified. These gaps or new needs stimulate new 
requirements, thus continuing the process or “cycle.” Feedback also serves an important 
role in quality control.  Consequently, the FBI and other agencies have begun sending 
customer surveys along with intelligence products to receive feedback.  
3. The Intelligence Community 
We often hear the term “intelligence community” used as though it was a 
monolithic entity, but more accurately, there are three intelligence communities. 
• The military intelligence community centered on the Department of 
Defense,  
• A foreign intelligence community centered on the CIA, and  
• A domestic intelligence community centered on the Departments of 
Justice (the FBI) and Homeland Security, but also including state, local 
and tribal law enforcement, and arguably, the broad group of Homeland 
Security disciplines, such as Public Health, Fire, Transportation, Private 
Security, etc. 
4. Federal Intelligence Community 
The sixteen federal intelligence agencies are the ones that most of us think of 




community, or “IC,” is actually prescribed by law, first starting with the National 




Air Force Intelligence Intelligence related to military mission 
Army Intelligence Intelligence related to military mission 
Central Intelligence Agency Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
Coast Guard Intelligence Information related to maritime security and HLD  
Defense Intelligence Agency Defense attaches and overall defense issues for DOD 
Department of Energy Analyzes foreign nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, energy 
security 
Department of Homeland Security Fuses law enforcement and intelligence information and HLS 
threats  
Department of State Intelligence related to foreign relations 
Department of the Treasury Collects and process information that affects fiscal and 
monetary issues, including terrorism financing 
Drug Enforcement Administration Information and enforcement of controlled substance laws 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Domestic counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
Marine Corps Intelligence Information related to military mission 
Nat’l Geo-Spatial Intelligence Geo-spatial data including maps and other targeting data 
National Reconnaissance Office Operates our nation’s reconnaissance satellites 
National Security Agency Signals collection and analysis 
Navy Intelligence Information related to military missions 
Table 2.   Federal Intelligence Community and associated missions 
 
5. The Domestic Intelligence Community  
Determining the proper composition of the domestic intelligence community is a 
central question to resolve to improve the nation’s intelligence capacity. This section 
discusses the historical development of the domestic counterterrorism community at the 






The FBI has a unique role in that it is part of both the federal intelligence 
community as described previously, as well as the domestic intelligence community. The 
latter role arises since the Bureau has the primary responsibility for counterterrorism 
within the United States per presidential order.19 Conventionally, the domestic 
intelligence community primarily consisted of solely the FBI. 
Prior to 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security did not exist, and state, local 
and tribal law enforcement intelligence was generally not a significant part of the 
counterterrorism or national security effort.  Rather, law enforcement intelligence was 
focused on intelligence as it related to criminal investigation aspects, not national security 
concerns. This absence of non-federal law enforcement involvement in national security 
developed when state and local law enforcement curtailed much of their intelligence 
activity in the 1970’s in a backlash against real and perceived abuses. So called “red 
squads” had been formed in many major police departments to root out communists, but 
grand jury investigations and lawsuits uncovered illegal spying, illegal searches, and 
disinformation campaigns. According to research by David E. Kaplan: 
Americans engaged in constitutionally protected free speech were 
routinely photographed, wiretapped, and harassed--all in the name of 
national security. In Memphis, the police department spied on the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and gathered data on 
political activists' bank accounts, phone records, and close associates. In 
New Haven, Conn., police wiretapped over a thousand people. In 
Philadelphia, then police chief Frank Rizzo boasted of holding files on 
18,000 people. The list of “subversives” grew to include the League of 
Woman Voters, civil rights groups, religious figures, and politicians 
running for office.20  
As a result, many law enforcement agencies shut their intelligence units down, or 
operated under onerous legislative restrictions. This exclusion of state, local and tribal 
police from the national security intelligence effort in the 1970’s formed the stage for 
their absence from the counterterrorism arena when al Qaeda decided to strike the United 
                                                 
19 George W. Bush, “United States Intelligence Activities” Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981 
at § 1.14(a). 
20 David E. Kaplan, “When the Cops Saw Only Red” U.S. News and World Report, May 8, 2006. 
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States in 2001. Much of our nation’s reform efforts after 9/11 have been devoted to 
figuring out how best to reintegrate these forces back into the domestic arsenal.21 
B. THE COUNTERTERRORISM TRIAD 
While 9/11 may be primarily perceived as an intelligence failure and discussed as 
such, it is important to place the intelligence failures in the larger context of 
“counterterrorism.” This is essential because, as the Joint Inquiry of Congress noted, the 
failure to act on the available intelligence was as important as the failure to gather 
intelligence.22 Similarly, the Gilmore Commission noted the need for our national 
strategy to combat terrorism to include not only intelligence, but also “all key functional 
domains,” and “it must be comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, 
prevention, preparedness and response.”23 
The 9/11 Commission agreed with the conclusions of the Gilmore Commission 
regarding the need for a comprehensive approach encompassing more than just the 
intelligence domain.24 Drawing on the conclusions of these commissions, and in 
analyzing the missions of the principal players in the various Homeland Security 
disciplines, three central components of counterterrorism emerge: intelligence, 
investigations and operations.  
The anti-terrorism aspects of these three components are discussed in detail in the 
following chapters, but it is useful at this point to summarize them as follows:   
 
                                                 
21 Though it will be discussed at length in following chapter on reforms, it’s worthwhile to note at this 
juncture that while our nation’s nearly 800,000 state, local, and tribal police were largely omitted from the 
intelligence community prior to 9/11, the membership chasm extended to a broad range of what we would 
now refer to as “Homeland Security disciplines,” including Public Health, Fire, Private Security, and so on. 
22 Richard A. Best, Jr., The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearings and the Status 
of the Investigation (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 16, 
2003). 
23 Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel 
to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, December 15, 2002), 2. 
24 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9 /11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, First Edition, 2004). 
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• “Intelligence” refers to the entire intelligence cycle, including identifying 
requirements or needs, collection, analysis, reporting, dissemination, and 
hopefully, feedback.   
• “Investigations” are law enforcement authorities’ attempts to solve crimes 
or attempted crime by investigation with the goal of arrest and 
prosecution. And, 
• “Operations” comprises those concrete operational counterterrorism 
missions, such as interdiction or prevention by deploying operational 
forces, as well as response and recovery operations, such as a hazardous 
material clean up from a biological or chemical attack. 
Thus, “counter” or “anti” terrorism can be thought of as a three-legged table that 
supports Homeland Security, with investigations, operations and intelligence forming the 
legs. Each leg of Homeland Security is interdependent. If one is missing, the table will 
fall. Likewise, if the table is of insufficient height or size to meet our needs, we cannot 
simply focus on raising or reshaping one of the legs—intelligence; the legs need to be 
coordinated with each other. Another useful analogy is to think of the trio synergistically 
and holistically, as three strands of a rope.  The separate strands are by themselves 
insufficient to lift much weight, but combined as a whole, they have a much greater 
capacity. 
To illustrate the interrelated and synergistic nature of the counterterrorism triad, 
the 9/11 context provides a classic, though tragic, example. In 9/11, even though salient 
and actionable intelligence existed, since it was not shared or coordinated with 
investigative or operational components, such as law enforcement agents, airport security 
or border patrol officers, it proved worthless. As a result, the opportunity to prevent the 
attack via a criminal investigation and or interdiction operation was lost.  
This is not to diminish the importance of the intelligence component; indeed, it 
may be the most important part of the triad. Homeland Security Secretary Michael 
Chertoff has fittingly referred to intelligence as critical to the “all hazards mission” and 
the “radar of the 21st century,”25 (a metaphor we will return to later in the 
Recommendations chapter). Additionally, the Commission on the Intelligence 
                                                 
25 Remarks by the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff 2006 Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice and SEARCH Symposium on Justice and Public Safety Information 
Sharing, March 14, 2006. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0273.shtm (accessed December 12, 
2006). 
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Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as 
the WMD Commission) further remarked,  “Every person with whom we spoke was 
unanimous on one point: there is nothing more important than having the best possible 
intelligence to combat the world’s deadliest weapons and most dangerous actors.”26 
Nonetheless, it remains that “intelligence” is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for effective counterterrorism.   
 
                                                 
26 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: The Commission, March 31, 
2005), 540. 
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IV. EFFORTS AT REFORMING THE NATION’S DOMESTIC 
COUNTERTERRORISM STRUCTURE 
“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The 
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. 
As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must 
disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”27  
      Abraham Lincoln  
In contrast to the bitterly divided America President Lincoln faced, our leaders 
have dealt with an America largely united in the righteousness of the anti-terrorism cause 
and in the belief that serious reform was necessary to protect the Homeland. Where 
parties differ, and sometimes appreciably, is their view of the nature and extent of the 
changes that are needed. Exacerbating the intellectual divide is that over five years have 
elapsed since the attacks, diminishing the sense of urgency, if not common purpose. On 
the positive side, the passage of time has brought perspective to apply to our reform 
efforts. What seemed useful or necessary may no longer be wise or there may be a better 
mousetrap. 
In following Lincoln’s admonition, this chapter will present the principal schools 
of thought on reforming the nation’s counterterrorism architecture, including areas of 
concurrence and divergence. This will entail examining the primary problems that were 
identified as contributing to our collective failure to prevent the attacks on September 11, 
the strengths and weaknesses of the reforms that were initiated as a result, and the 
problems that remain. In particular, we will focus on the effectiveness of organisms, pre 
and post September 11, which employ a multi-agency approach to counter-terrorism 
efforts.  
According to 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, 9/11 “was a failure of 
policy, management, capability and, above all, a failure of imagination.”  The four 
components in this quadrant of failure will form the framework for the analysis in this 
chapter.  
                                                 
27 Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress -- Concluding Remarks, Washington, D.C. 
December 1, 1862. http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/quotes.htm (accessed 
December 4, 2006). 
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A. THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM 
As with many problems, unfortunately often a major calamity is needed as a 
catalyst before reform takes place. Regrettably, it turns out the longstanding problems in 
our domestic counterterrorism community were not immune from this need. In particular, 
the intelligence discipline and information-sharing processes had significant, long-
standing, and apparently obvious, shortcomings. 
At a high-level meeting on September 11, 1998, the federal intelligence 
community (IC) prophetically concluded that the “failure to improve operations 
management, resource allocation, and other key issues within the [IC], including making 
substantial and sweeping changes in the way the nation collects, analyzes, and produces 
intelligence, will likely result in a catastrophic systemic intelligence failure.”28  
When this prophecy was tragically fulfilled exactly three years later, the post-9/11 
scrutiny produced unanimity that our previous domestic counterterrorism efforts were 
indeed grossly deficient, and the maxim, “9/11 was an intelligence failure,” was created.  
In particular, the 9/11 Commission and others have recognized that there was a general 
intelligence failure of information sharing and cooperation among all levels of the 
government, and a specific intelligence failure to “connect the dots” in order to prevent 
the attacks.29  
Reinforcing what the 9/11 Commission Report found, a US Senate Intelligence 
Committee reported that:  
Serious problems in information sharing…persisted, prior to September 
11, between the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence 
Community agencies. This included other federal agencies as well as state 
and local authorities. This lack of communication and collaboration 
                                                 
28 Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11: A Report to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader from the Subcommittee on Terrorism and 
Homeland Security House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence July 17, 2002. Note also the 
inclusion of “operations” as an essential component with intelligence. Available at 
http://www.house.gov/harman/terrorism/071702_Report.html (accessed March 7, 2007). 
29 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9 /11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, First Edition, 2004). 
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deprived those other entities, as well as the Intelligence Community, of 
access to potentially valuable information in the ‘war’ against Bin Ladin.30  
Because of these acknowledged intelligence debacles, immediately after the 9/11 
attacks there was a consensus that we needed to revamp the American domestic 
intelligence structure to combat the threat of terrorism on our soil.  On the organizational 
side, billions of dollars have been spent reorganizing existing structures and countless 
new information sharing groups and mechanisms have been established. These dollars, 
coupled with public and political pressure have brought a myriad of new counterterrorism 
architecture such as multi-agency fusion centers, regional intelligence centers, a doubling 
of the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF’s), and so on. 
On the legislative front, Congress has passed the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA),31 and the executive branch has issued its own 
multiple executive orders and strategies. We will discuss the IRTPA at length in the next 
section, but there are three interrelated executive documents that bear introducing now as 
they set out a foundation for the reform efforts-- the National Security Strategy, the 
National Intelligence Strategy of the United States and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan. .  
The National Security Strategy lays out the President's vision of how to protect 
America and end tyranny elsewhere in the world.  It has five main themes that center 
around defeating terrorism by a strong America that promotes freedom and democracy 
throughout the world. Most relevant to our focus is the strategic objective and mandate to 
“Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and 
Opportunities of the 21st Century.”32 To bring life to this charge, the National 
Intelligence Strategy (NIS) attempts to tailor US national intelligence to 21st century 
threats by identifying ten principle objectives:  
                                                 
30 United States. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Final Report - Part 1 
(Washington, DC: GPO, December 10, 2002). 
31  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), PL108-408 (December 17, 
2004). 
32  United States. President. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2006). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed on 
February 12, 2007). 
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• Build an integrated intelligence capability to address threats to the 
homeland. 
• Strengthen analytic expertise, methods and practices.  
• Rebalance, integrate and optimize collection capabilities.  
• Attract, engage and unify an innovative and results-focused work force. 
• Ensure that decision-makers can access the intelligence they need when 
they need it. 
• Establish new and strengthen existing foreign intelligence relationships. 
• Create clear, uniform security practices and rules.  
• Exploit path breaking scientific and research advances.  
• Learn from our successes and mistakes.  
• Eliminate redundancy33 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), developed by the 
Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and endorsed by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ), particularly addresses domestic intelligence reform needs. The NCISP’s 
overarching goal is to link together all levels of law enforcement, including officers on 
the street, intelligence analysts, unit commanders, and police executives via a nationwide 
communications capability for sharing critical data.  
The Plan makes twenty-eight recommendations that outline model policies, 
standards, and guidelines for developing a local law enforcement intelligence function. It 
makes recommendations regarding key implementation issues and barriers; and identifies 
methods for developing and sharing critical data. The recommendations attempt to 
promote: 
• A model intelligence-sharing plan. 
• A mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing. 
• A blueprint for law enforcement administrators to follow when enhancing 
or building an intelligence system. 
• A model for intelligence process principles and policies. 
• A plan that respects and protects individuals’ privacy and civil rights. 
                                                 
33  United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. National Intelligence Strategy of the 
United States of America: Transformation Through Integration and Innovation (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, 2005). Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2005/intell-051026-dni01.htm (accessed on October 21, 
2006). 
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• Technology architecture to provide secure, seamless sharing of 
information among systems. 
• A national model for intelligence training. 
• An outreach plan to promote timely and credible intelligence sharing. 
• A plan that leverages existing systems and networks, yet allows flexibility 
for technology and process enhancements.34 
Most of these reform efforts are aimed at improving our intelligence capacity; 
however, as discussed in Chapter III, 9/11 reviews have made it clear that the intelligence 
failures did not occur in a vacuum. A joint inquiry of Congress summarized the 
intelligence failures in the larger context of counterterrorism in an extensive review of 
our nation’s intelligence system: 
The findings further suggested systemic weaknesses of intelligence and 
law enforcement communities: an absence of emphasis on the 
counterterrorist mission, a decline in funding, limited use of information 
technology, poor inter-agency coordination, insufficient analytic focus and 
quality, and inadequate human intelligence. Above all, there was a lack of 
a government-wide strategy for acquiring and analyzing intelligence and 
for acting on it to eliminate or reduce terrorist threat.35  
Our discussion begins at the identified problem of a disconnected and 
dysfunctional intelligence “community” extant prior to the attacks on September 11. 
B. A COMMUNITY IN NAME ONLY 
Ambassador John Negroponte laid out the organizational reform challenge during 
his confirmation hearings to become our nation’s first Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI). In order to overcome problems such as the failure of the FBI and CIA to share 
information about the 9/11 terrorists before the attack, Ambassador Negroponte 
explained that America needed to create “a single intelligence community that cooperates 
seamlessly, that moves quickly, and that spends more time thinking about the future than 
the past.”36 This unity was needed to overcome problems identified in the 9/11 review, 
                                                 
34 United States. Department of Justice. National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Washington, 
DC: Department of Justice, October 2003), iv. Available at 
http://www.iir.com/global/products/NCISP_Plan.pdf (accessed January 19, 2007). 
35 Best, 16. 
36 John Negroponte, US Senate Confirmation Hearings Testimony, April 12, 2005. Available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Apr/12-450912.html (accessed on December 12, 2006). 
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including the failure to share warnings between FBI field offices and other agencies and 
the CIA’s failure to pass the names of suspected terrorists to other agencies, such as the 
Federal Aviation Administration and Customs agencies.37 
Perhaps understandably, since traditionally the intelligence community had been 
considered largely the province of only federal agencies, and since it was the federal 
government conducting the reviews of 9/11, the initial integration and reform efforts 
focused primarily on the federal intelligence community.  
1. Coordinating the Federal Intelligence Community 
The WMD Commission pointed out that since the federal intelligence community 
lacked centralized direction and coordination, it was a “community” in name only.  “The 
15 intelligence agencies rarely act with a unity of purpose,” the Commission said in its 
overview of the report.38  In response, Congress and the executive branch have adopted 
three major reforms: creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
who ostensibly oversees the sixteen-member federal intelligence community39 and is 
responsible for resolving the internecine squabbles between the FBI, CIA and DHS, 
creation of a center to co-locate key components of each of these agencies, and the 
demand to create an environment in which vital information will be shared effectively. 
2. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act Reform Efforts 
Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), 
Congress codified into law the three reforms that are important to our analysis: the 
position of intelligence “czar” the DNI, to oversee the intelligence community, the 
establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to coordinate 
counterterrorism intelligence and operations, and the formation of an Information Sharing  
 
                                                 
37 9/11 Commission Report, 258. 
38 The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: The Commission, March 31, 
2005), 5. 
39 At the time of the 9/11 Commission Report, the Office of National Security Intelligence had not 
been created within the DEA, thus it became the 16th. 
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Environment (ISE) to facilitate sharing of information.40 The NCTC and ISE are 
discussed more fully later in Section C of this chapter in connection with fusion centers; 
this section focuses on the DNI.  
Under IRTPA, management of the federal IC is by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). The IRTPA grants the DNI the authority to integrate the 
IC's functioning according to the management principle of “centralized oversight, 
decentralized execution.”41 Even though the ODNI leads the federal intelligence 
community, and ODNI components produce finished intelligence, the ODNI does not run 
day-to-day operations in the federal intelligence agencies. The entire core functions that 
each member of the federal IC traditionally performed, including, collection of 
information, analysis, operations, technology development, dissemination of intelligence, 
and internal management are all still performed by the various intelligence agencies.  
According to many reviewers, the DNI position has thus far fallen short of its 
mandate to ensure effective intelligence collection and sharing. A recent Senate 
Intelligence Committee report concluded, “The Committee is extremely frustrated that 
four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and after Intelligence 
Community promises to improve information sharing, the Community appears to have 
made little progress in this regard.”42 Additionally, at a recent intelligence sharing 
conference for the federal IC, sponsored by the Director of National Intelligence, a 
variety of intelligence experts acknowledged major barriers to effective information 
sharing remain. One speaker compared the 16-agency U.S. intelligence community to 8-
year-old soccer players bunching around the ball leaving the remainder of the field 
uncovered.43   
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41 Ibid. 
42 United States. Senate. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. S. Rpt. 109-142. 
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3. National Counterterrorism Center 
In a further attempt to resolve ongoing information sharing problems, President 
Bush established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by executive order in 
September 2004. Congress, in the IRTPA, later codified it in December 2004.44 The 
Presidential and Congressional intent is that the NCTC will serve as the primary 
organization in the United States Government for integrating and analyzing all 
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. 
The IRTPA places the NCTC under the Office of the DNI with a mandate to: 
• Serve as the federal government’s multi-agency center analyzing and 
integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, 
including threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad.  
• Conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities 
• Assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism 
activities 
• Function as a shared knowledge bank for the counterterrorism community, 
making information available to the intelligence, law enforcement, 
Homeland Security, diplomatic, and military communities across the 
United States Government.45 
The NCTC operates as a partnership of federal organizations including the CIA, 
FBI, and Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security. Representatives from 
the IC meet, many via videoconference, and update the nation’s threat matrix three times 
a day at the NCTC. We will discuss more about the NCTC in the next chapter in the 
discussion of collaboration challenges. 
C. REFORMING THE DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNITY 
As a starting point of analysis, there is concurrence in the literature that the very 
nature of the American political system is at the core of the problem of developing 
effective counter-terrorism architecture. The American system consists of a vast number 
of political units, including an immense federal bureaucracy of competing agencies with 
overlapping and redundant counter-terrorism responsibilities, along with over twenty 
                                                 
44 IRTPA, Section 1012, PL 108-458, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” 69 
Federal Register 53589, September 1, 2004. 
45 Ibid. 
32
thousand cities, counties and states, and a multitude of other political sub-divisions. Just 
in the law enforcement arena, there are nearly 800,000 officers spread among some 
18,000 police departments and some 3000 sheriff offices.46 This morass confounds 
information sharing on a basic level, let alone achieving integration of efforts.47 The 
Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF) has concurred that one result of this 
complex system of government is ineffective communication and confusion over roles 
and responsibilities for counter-terrorism.48   
1. Defining Mission Spaces 
Homeland Security involves six critical mission areas as defined by the federal 
government:49 
• Intelligence and warning, 
• Emergency preparedness and response, 
• Domestic counterterrorism, 
• Critical infrastructure and key asset protection, 
• Defense against catastrophic threats, and 
• Securing the borders and transportation system 
The federal role in these critical mission areas is fairly clear; much of it is defined 
by presidential decree or Congress.  For example, Congress and the executive branch 
have designated the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as 
securing the homeland and protecting it against conventional and unconventional attacks 
in the United States. President Bush, via presidential directive, has also designated the 
Attorney General of the United States as the lead federal agency responsible for criminal 
investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups within the 
                                                 
46 Brian A. Reaves and Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 
2000 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, October 2002, NCJ 194066), 1. 
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United States, as well as related domestic intelligence collection efforts.50  The Attorney 
General generally acts through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but many other 
federal agencies, in particular the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have central 
roles in the counter-terrorism arena. 
2. Remaking the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
As chronicled previously, as the lead for domestic counterterrorism, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation has shouldered the greatest share of the criticism regarding the 
failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. Those criticisms have centered on the discovery that 
the FBI failed to integrate and analyze information within its own field offices and among 
its own agents, as well as integrate information that was available in other agencies, such 
as state and local law enforcement, departments of motor vehicles, etc.   
However, the FBI argues its efforts were constrained by shortages of key 
personnel, in addition to technological and legal limitations. For example, before 
September 11, executive branch interpretations of laws intended to protect privacy also 
served to inhibit information sharing within the FBI. The building of a “wall” between 
intelligence gatherers and criminal investigators to protect privacy also served to prohibit 
information sharing between these two critical counterterrorism components. After 9/11, 
Congress amended these laws to remove any barriers between intelligence agents and 
criminal investigators. In testifying in support of the PATRIOT Act legislation that 
removed this metaphorical wall, CIA Director Porter Goss said, “The wall was a barrier 
against full and discerning dialogue and greatly impinged on the effective use of critical 
tools necessary to fight terrorism.”51 
Nonetheless, despite the proposition that there is a synergy between this two vital 
counterterrorism components, some observers remain convinced that the very nature of 
intelligence and investigations make these critical functions ill suited to be housed within 
the same agency. The argument is that it is unreasonable to expect that a law enforcement 
                                                 
50 George W. Bush Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
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agency, such as the FBI, can effectively conduct domestic security intelligence since it 
also has to remain focused on law enforcement and criminal investigations. 
Consequently, some have argued for the United States to create a new domestic 
intelligence agency without law enforcement responsibilities, modeled on the British MI-
5. Federal Judge Pozner, for example, has argued that an intelligence focus is inconsistent 
with an investigative focus because of the differing mindsets. He advocates creation of a 
domestic intelligence agency, a model that Great Britain and most of the major world 
democracies have chosen.52 
Pozner and other advocates of separate law enforcement and domestic intelligence 
agencies argue the intelligence and law enforcement cultures are very different and 
placing intelligence within a primarily investigative agency invariably leads to a de-
emphasis of intelligence. They believe a nation benefits by having an administrative and 
personnel structure focused solely on intelligence, especially counterterrorism. Judge 
Pozner recently elaborated on this “investigative case” versus “intelligence gathering” 
problem: 
A law-enforcement approach to terrorism can cause intelligence data to be 
evaluated from the too-narrow perspective of its utility in building a 
criminal case; retard the sharing of information lest full credit for a 
successful prosecution be denied the field office that began the 
investigation; and discourage the collection and retention of information. 
This last point is related to the difference between collecting information 
for the sake of knowledge and collecting it for the sake of building a case. 
Criminal investigators want to collect enough information to prove their 
case but not enough to give defense counsel information that may be 
usable to exculpate the defendant. Intelligence officers don’t have that 
inhibition.53 
Additionally, Senator Shelby from the Senate Intelligence Committee has 
similarly observed an intrinsic problem in housing intelligence within a law enforcement 
agency. In commenting on the negative impact on housing intelligence within the FBI, he 
observed:  
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   . . . Its agents are trained and acculturated, rewarded and promoted 
within an institutional culture the primary purpose of which is the 
prosecution of criminals. ...  Information is stored, retrieved, and simply 
understood principally through the conceptual prism of a “case”—a 
discrete bundle of information the fundamental purpose of which is to 
prove elements of crimes against specific potential defendants in a court of 
law. 
The FBI’s reification of “the case” pervades the entire organization, and is 
reflected at every level and in every area: in the autonomous, decentralized 
authority and traditions of the Field Offices; in the priorities and 
preference given in individual career paths, in resource allocation, and 
within the Bureau’s status hierarchy to criminal investigative work and 
post hoc investigations as opposed to long-term analysis; in the lack of 
understanding of and concern with modern information management 
technologies and processes; and in deeply-entrenched individual mindsets 
that prize the production of evidence-supported narratives of defendant 
wrongdoing over the drawing of probabilistic inferences based upon 
incomplete and fragmentary information in order to support decision 
making… 
Far from embracing probabilistic inference, “knowledge” in a law 
enforcement context aspires—in its ideal form at least—not only to 
certainty but also to admissibility, the two essential conceptual elements of 
being able to prove someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court 
of law. Within such a paradigm, information exists to be segregated and 
ultimately employed under carefully managed circumstances for the single 
specific purpose for which it was gathered.54 
Major democracies, such as France, Germany, Canada, and Australia generally 
follow Great Britain’s MI5 model, separating police powers of investigation and arrest 
from intelligence collectors. A primary reason these democracies have separated 
intelligence from criminal investigations is for the stated purpose of protecting of civil 
liberties.55 These democracies subscribe to the belief that removing the coercive power of 
arrest and prosecution from the intelligence collectors lessens the opportunity to curtail 
essential liberties such as the expression of free speech. However, in perhaps an ironic 
twist, many civil libertarians in America have opposed the creation of a separate domestic 
                                                 
54 Final Report of the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into September 11 “September 11 and the 
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intelligence agency for the same reason.  Gregory Najeimi of the ACLU argues, 
“Creating a domestic agency would be bad for civil liberties and bad for security, we 
haven't had a domestic CIA since the country was founded. We went through all the 
years of the Cold War without a domestic CIA, we don't need one now.”56  
Current FBI Director Robert Mueller has argued against removing domestic 
intelligence from the Bureau for reasons of effectiveness, stating that splitting the law 
enforcement and intelligence functions into separate agencies “would leave both agencies 
fighting the war on terrorism with one hand tied behind their backs.”57 
In considering this issue, the 9/11 Commission ultimately agreed with Director 
Mueller and specifically recommended against creation of a new domestic intelligence 
agency at this time, urging instead that the FBI be given an opportunity to reform. The 
Commission outlined its concerns:  
• If a new domestic intelligence agency were outside of the Department of 
Justice, the process of legal oversight—never easy—could become even 
more difficult. Abuses of civil liberties could create a backlash that would 
impair the collection of needed intelligence 
• Creating a new domestic intelligence agency would divert attention of the 
officials most responsible for current counterterrorism efforts while the 
threat remains high. Putting a new player into the mix of federal agencies 
with counterterrorism responsibilities would exacerbate existing 
information-sharing problems. 
• A new domestic intelligence agency would need to acquire assets and 
personnel.  The FBI already has employees, facilities and relationships 
with state and local law enforcement, the CIA, and foreign intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies. 
• Counterterrorism investigations in the United States very quickly become 
matters that involve violations of criminal law and possible law 
enforcement action. Because the FBI can have agents working criminal 
matters and agents working intelligence investigations concerning the 
same international terrorism target, the full range of investigative tools 
against a suspected terrorist can be considered within one agency. 58   
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Congress and the Executive Branch have to date agreed with the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation to focus on reforming the Bureau, adding 7000 
employees and doubling the FBI’s budget to six billion dollars since 2001. Director 
Mueller has thus set out to remake the Bureau into a more effective counterterrorism 
agency, addressing both law enforcement and intelligence.  
On the investigative side, because of the increased resources and renewed focus, 
counterterrorism investigations now account for half of the investigations conducted by 
the FBI.59 However, the most significant changes have been in the area of intelligence 
reform. In response to new resources and the mandate to focus more on intelligence, the 
FBI has undertaken significant organizational reform with the stated goal to create an 
Intelligence Program on par with its investigative programs. According to the FBI, “now 
that the Intelligence Program is established and developing, we are turning to the next 
stage of transforming the Bureau into an intelligence agency.”60 
Director Mueller describes these reforms as including new enhanced analytical 
capabilities, state-of-the-art information technology, and an integrated intelligence 
structure at headquarters and in the field. The FBI has also created new Field Intelligence 
Groups (FIG’s), discussed in Chapter VI, in each of its field offices, and has added many 
more Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF’s), also discussed in Chapter VI.   
Despite these changes, some concern remained as to whether the FBI had 
sufficiently transformed from largely an investigative agency, to also become an 
intelligence agency.  Because of this concern, the President directed the FBI to go further 
in its reforms and create a National Security Branch within the Bureau. The new National 
Security Branch (NSB) consolidates three previously separate programs—
counterterrorism, counterintelligence and intelligence. Even more significantly, the DNI 
was given budget authority over the FBI's national intelligence activities, i.e., the NSB, 
and the DNI was given specified authority to concur in the appointment of the executive 
assistant director (EAD) of the NSB.  
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To some this is seen as a possible portent of a future new domestic intelligence 
agency argued for by Pozner and others, should efforts to reform the Bureau be judged 
inadequate. By consolidating counterterrorism and intelligence in one branch, with 
funding controlled outside of the Bureau, some view this as a possible transition stage in 
preparation for moving these responsibilities outside of the FBI. 
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3. Where’s A Cop When You Need One? The Role of State, Local and 
Tribal Authorities in Counterterrorism 
In contrast to the federal government, the role of state, local and tribal (SLT) 
government in Homeland Security and counterterrorism is not well defined.62  This 
applies to how the federal government views the state, local and tribal role, and how SLT 
governments view their own role.  
The federal government has traditionally had a narrow view of the role of SLT 
governments, especially the local role, in the six critical mission areas of Homeland 
Security. The prevailing view was that local government was essentially limited to a 
“first responder,” role, responsible for responding to and mitigating the impacts of an 
attack, but having only a supporting role regarding “intelligence and warning” and 
“domestic counterterrorism.”  This is reflected in the above-mentioned presidential 
directives, which recognize the first responder role but omit mention of local 
participation in the others. 
Lest this be interpreted as the federal government running roughshod over the 
wishes of the states, and particularly “the locals,” it needs to be made clear that local 
governments have generally taken a similarly narrow view regarding their appropriate 
role in Homeland Security. Though there are some exceptions, the research reveals that, 
with the exception of New York City, most cities have not developed any significant 
counterterrorism capacity.63 Although not universally true, in general, most cities have 
focused on the first responder role, i.e., mitigation and response, and they have deferred 
to the federal government in the intelligence, investigations and operations domains, 
playing primarily a supporting role when the FBI requests assistance on a particular 
investigation or identified intelligence need.   
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The previous chapter described the diminished role of non-federal law 
enforcement in national security intelligence starting in the 1970’s because of real and 
perceived civil rights abuses. When the nation awoke to the need for Homeland Security 
after the 9/11 attacks, only sixteen percent of state and local agencies reported having a 
specialized unit or individual assigned responsibility for addressing terrorism, and only 
about ten percent of police agencies had an intelligence unit, largely found only in the 
larger departments.64 
The advantages of deferring the responsibility for counterterrorism to the federal 
government, primarily the FBI, are substantial.  Immediately before 9/11, much of the 
country was entering into a period of severe financial and budgetary limitations, which 
culminated in a loss of law enforcement and other first responder positions. By avoiding 
a principal role in counterterrorism, SLT governments have avoided the tremendous 
personnel costs associated with this mission.  
Further, this diminished role for local government has lessened their liability 
exposure considerably. Counterterrorism activities carry with them considerable political 
risk. By definition, counterterrorism will necessarily involve political and religious 
considerations.  Accusations of racial and religious profiling, and “Patriot Act blowback” 
are the norm. Many cities and states have laws regulating intelligence collection 
involving religious and political groups, and a long tradition of emphasizing the 
promotion of First Amendment rights. Because the federal government has taken the lead 
on counterterrorism, local governments have been freed to concentrate on the largely 
non-controversial areas of emergency response and preparedness. They have been spared 
the negative publicity and criticism that agencies, such as the United States Attorney’s 
Office, the FBI, DHS and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have had to 
endure.  
There is also the very real problem that high-profile crime problems other than 
terrorism exist. Local government officials are pressured to use scarce resources to take 
action on visible crime, seldom on the hypothetical terrorism threat. For example, in 
response to a wave of shootings and murders, Philadelphia Police Commissioner 
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Sylvester Johnson moved in late 2004 to take back some of the limited personnel he had 
assigned to a terrorism unit. When questioned by the media about moving these officers 
back to fight urban crime, Commissioner Johnson emphasized the violent crime problem 
and stated, “We haven't seen the Taliban in Philadelphia.”65 
Incorporation of the tribes into the counterterrorism community has also been 
problematic. Although uttering “tribal” when mentioning “state” and “local” has become 
a sort of shibboleth for Homeland Security professionals, the actual integration of tribal 
law enforcement into the anti-terrorism community has been limited. Traditionally, there 
has been a lack of integration and jurisdictional clarity between Native American 
communities and local, state and federal officials regarding law enforcement, which will 
have to be overcome.66 The importance of tribal participation is underscored by the 
international border and port security issues that concern Tribal lands, as well as the 
critical infrastructure located on Tribal lands, such as dams and reservoirs, electrical 
generation plants and energy pipelines, drinking water wastewater systems, and railroads 
and bridges.  
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V. EVOLUTIONARY ROADBLOCKS - THE STRUGGLE TO 
COLLABORATE 
Collaboration has been seen as an integral part of the solution in response to many 
of the main counterterrorism issues and problems detailed in the previous chapters, 
especially in overcoming information sharing difficulties. Accordingly, much of the 
counterterrorism reform effort over the past five years has been devoted to developing 
collaborative models. Illustrative is Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which 
sets out “expanded regional collaboration” as one of the overarching national priorities in 
the National Preparedness Goals, and “strengthening information sharing and 
collaboration capabilities” as one of the main capability based priorities.67  
This fecund period has produced a bounty of offspring, and as in nature, there 
tends to be an overproduction of offspring, resulting in a competition for survival. This 
thesis juncture is thus where we attempt to identify the favorable variations that should be 
passed on to subsequent counterterrorism progeny, and the unfavorable traits that may 
lead to die-out and ideally would be “selected out.”  As in nature, “natural selection” is 
not the only process at work; we also have to consider the influence of non-adaptive 
factors, such as politics, on counter-terrorism evolution.  
A. COLLABORATION  
Since “collaboration” will be a common thread sewn throughout the remainder of 
the chapters, and terms like “effective collaboration” and “truly collaborative” are 
employed in this thesis, this is a useful point to briefly explore the underlying principles 
of what is being advocated when there is a call for “collaboration.”   
“Collaboration” is different from “coordination” and “cooperation,” even though 
all three are important. “Coordination” is the least intensive relationship; coordination is 
about efficiency, about developing a framework to ensure that otherwise disparate forces 
act more harmoniously, e.g., local and federal law enforcement agreeing to avoid 
duplicative or conflicting efforts. “Cooperation” is more in depth than coordination. It 
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involves individual agencies maintaining their separate mandates and responsibilities, but 
working together to accomplish common goals. For example, multiple agencies co-
locating resources in an intelligence center, but with each agency still primarily 
responsible for directing its own personnel to meet their respective agency missions, 
constitutes “cooperation.”   
“Collaboration” is more intense and more ambitious. In collaborating, people and 
organizations are willing to fundamentally change their previous way of doing business 
and share responsibilities and resources.  From an organizational point of view, 
researchers from the Wilder Research Center define collaboration as: 
Collaboration is a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship 
entered into by two or more organizations to achieve common goals. The 
relationship includes a commitment to: a definition of mutual relationships 
and goals, a jointly developed structure and shared responsibility, mutual 
authority and accountability for success, and sharing of resources and 
rewards.68 
Consequently, a “collaborative” counterterrorism center would have certain 
characteristics, such as the participants jointly designing, and especially jointly 
governing, according to a shared vision and mission and shared resources. The 
participants would also share responsibility for failures and success. As such, in a 
politically dominated and bureaucratically inclined system, collaborations are inherently 
much more difficult to achieve than cooperative approaches. 
Importantly, a collaborative approach is also about creating something new, not 
merely moving existing structures and systems to a new location. A collaborative 
approach seeks to create synergy from a holistic view. Michael Schrage describes this 
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Collaboration is the process of shared creation: two or more individuals 
with complementary skills interacting to create a shared understanding 
that none had previously possessed or could have come to on their own. 
Collaboration creates a shared meaning about a process, a product, or an 
event. … Something is there that wasn’t there before.69 
Accordingly, the benefit from a collaborative approach, and what makes the 
struggle worthwhile, is that our prevention and response capabilities can be increased 
because the whole will be greater than its parts. More importantly, beyond just greater 
efficiencies in using Homeland Security resources, and improved information sharing, 
collaborations create the possibility of new solutions. The possibility of new solutions is 
especially important in the face of an adaptive enemy. 
B. FEDERAL CENTRIC ISSUES 
Most observers agree that are nations’ counterterrorism efforts have not followed 
a collaborative approach; rather they have been primarily federally coordinated efforts, 
with a recent trend toward more cooperative, and hopefully collaborative, approaches. 
The previous chapter detailed the reasons our counterterrorism system has developed 
predominantly federal characteristics, many of which are logical and expected, but there 
are problems with this development.  To begin with, a federal dominated, federal centric 
program is just that—a program that focuses on federal priorities. The National 
Governor’s Association recently surveyed each of the state Homeland Security directors. 
The Homeland Security directors were virtually unanimous in voicing concern over the 
lack of state input into federal policy development, and in recommending that the federal 
government coordinate with states prior to adopting and implementing Homeland 
Security policies.70  
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has also surveyed its 
members and come to the conclusion that a serious and fundamental flaw exists in our 
national strategy in that it was developed “without sufficiently seeking or incorporating 
the advice, expertise or consent of public safety officials” at the state, local and tribal 
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level. In arguing for putting more of a state, local and tribal presence in the gene pool, the 
IACP report stresses the importance of local, not federal design.71 Stephen Flynn, a 
former member of the National Security Council and a senior fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations has extensively studied counterterrorism reform efforts, and he concurs 
that a central reason that serious problems remain is that “it’s a top-down, purely federal 
enterprise.”72  
To illustrate the problems of perspective, recent bombings in London and Madrid 
had enormous implications for local officials’ response and prevention efforts regarding 
public transportation systems.  Nonetheless, when contacted immediately after the 
attacks, federal authorities simply did not have the information local authorities needed. 
As Charles Ramsey, former chief of the Washington Metropolitan Police stated, “the FBI 
is worrying about who might have done it, but what I care about is that there was an 
attack on a transit system and I have rush hour coming up . . . I need to know what I can 
do proactively to strengthen the security of our transit system.”73 In the absence of timely 
information from the federal government, many local jurisdictions instead relied on the 
NYPD who had their own people on the scene looking for locally relevant information 
within hours of the attacks. The NYPD liaison was on the scene in minutes, and his report 
to NYPD in New York enabled them to take preventative measures in time for the 
morning rush hour, including doubling the number of officers assigned to the subways. 
NYPD Commissioner Kelly explained the presence and perspective of local officers 
abroad “gives the NYPD the advantage of immediate, firsthand intelligence about the 
methods terrorists employed in attacking mass transit, hotels and synagogues in foreign 
cities.”74 
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There further appears to be widespread dissatisfaction with the timeliness and 
quality of information sharing. The National Governor’s Association survey of state 
Homeland Security directors revealed that a majority of the directors are “somewhat or 
completely dissatisfied with the specificity and actionable quality of the intelligence their 
states receive from the federal government.”75  
On the local government level, according to Chief of Police William Lansdowne, 
the San Diego Police Department relies on cable television news to stay abreast of threats 
because in his experience the dissemination system runs about eighteen hours behind the 
actual event.76 William Bratton, former New York City Police Chief, and current head of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, has voiced similar concerns about untimely 
information, saying that it often arrived so late that it was of little value.77 Chief Bratton 
stated that he often got his information from cable news networks, hours before bulletins 
came from federal agencies, and he blamed it on a system of JTTF’s and analytical 
agencies that are focused on investigations and not geared to provide real-time 
intelligence to local officials who need to respond operationally to threats.78 Interviews of 
the chiefs of the Chicago, Las Vegas and Washington D.C. Metropolitan departments 
revealed the same concerns expressed by Chief Bratton.79 
C. INTEGRATION OF STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL RESOURCES INTO 
THE COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNITY 
If the benefits described in the previous chapter of non-federal law enforcement 
staying out of the fray are many, so are the costs. To begin with, federal law enforcement 
simply does not have adequate resources to fulfill the counter-terrorism task. Relying on 
a federal-centric prevention program is counter-intuitive when you consider that the FBI 
has only a little over 12,000 agents, but there are some 800,000 local law enforcement 
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officers--personnel who understand and have extensive interaction with the communities 
they police. These officers are often in a better position to be terrorism related 
intelligence collectors, in a vastly more extensive manner than the federal government.   
 
Type of agency 
Number of 
agencies
Number of full-time  
sworn officers 
Total  796,518 
All State and local 17,784 708,022 
Local police 12,666 440,920 
Sheriff 3,070 164,711 
Primary State 49 56,348 
Special jurisdiction 1,376 43,413 
Texas constable 623 2,630 
Federal  88,496 
 
Table 3.   Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers80 
 
In addition to excluding the largest portion of our nation’s law enforcement 
resources from the national security effort, a federal-centric role also omitted the non-
federal perspective from the design of the Homeland Security apparatus.  Because of this, 
there has been widespread concern that state and local needs have not been met. 
To address the concern regarding the role of local authorities in the 
counterterrorism effort, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has 
launched the Taking Command Initiative (TCI). The IACP has pinpointed five key 
principles about local involvement that it feels are essential to consider in the 
development of an effective national strategy to safeguard the Homeland.81  
1. All Terrorism Is Local 
Even though terrorist acts may have national implications, they are all inherently 
local crimes that local and regional officials will have the primary responsibility to 
handle, at least initially.  More significantly, because terrorists typically live and operate 
in local communities, as demonstrated by the September 11 terrorists, local authorities 
are considerably more likely to encounter them. To cite an example, the vast majority of 
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contacts with persons on the terrorism “watch list” are made by local law enforcement 
officers (and undoubtedly many other members of the counter-terrorism community such 
as firefighters, public health officers and private security).82  Local authorities are also 
much more likely to notice suspicious behavior, especially subtle changes, than federal 
authorities are. The recent London Metro terrorist bombings and the failed British 
airplane plot reinforced the IACP’s position, as these terrorist acts demonstrate the threat 
of local, or “home grown” terrorists is increasing. 
Thus, properly trained and equipped local officials are often best positioned to 
interdict terrorists before an attack occurs, and an effective national security strategy 
“must be developed in an environment that fully acknowledges and accepts the reality 
that local authorities, not federal, have the primary responsibility for preventing, 
responding to and recovering from terrorist attacks.”83  
2. Prevention Is Paramount 
Because there is a distorted view of the appropriate role of local authorities, 
federal support of response and recovery efforts by local authorities have superseded 
support of prevention efforts.  No one disputes the importance of the first responder role, 
but fundamentally, the focus, as with all crime, should be on prevention.  
3. Hometown Security Is Homeland Security 
Since local authorities have a unique position in combating crime and the greatest 
opportunity to deal with suspects in their communities, a properly funded group of local 
authorities promotes national security.  Additionally, this is one of the cornerstones to the 
“all-crimes” approach to Homeland Security. The idea behind “all-crimes” is that the 
actual acts of terrorism are thus far rare and difficult to detect.  However, terrorists, such 
as the 9/11 terrorists, frequently need to rely on other crimes to facilitate their plots. 
Consequently, investigating and interdicting crimes such as identity theft, license 
violations, human smuggling, weapons trafficking, and crimes that fund terrorists, e.g.,  
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fraud and theft, is a logical strategy to disrupt and prevent attacks. Many, if not most of 
these crimes are handled by local authorities, emphasizing why local participation in the 
design and implementation of Homeland Security is crucial. 
4. Homeland Security Strategies Must Be Coordinated Nationally, Not 
Federally 
The ability for local authorities to impact policy has been limited because they 
have been treated as “advisors” to the federal government.  The Taking Command 
solution is to adopt a national, rather than a federal approach to Homeland Security 
planning and strategy development.84 Traditional “federal” efforts have not ensured that 
all levels of government were treated as “full and equal” partners.  A collaborative 
approach will not only allow for better information sharing (essential to all aspects of the 
counterterrorism triad of intelligence, investigations and operations), but it is essential to 
ensure that the counterterrorism programs that are created actually meet SLT needs, as 
well as federal. A collaborative approach also increases the likelihood of buy in by all 
members of the counterterrorism community, an important consideration in enlisting the 
participation of as much of the nearly 800,000 local law enforcement community as 
possible. 
5. The Importance of Bottom Up Engineering, the Diversity of the State, 
Tribal and Local Public Safety Community and Non-Competitive 
Collaboration 
The IACP members feel the one-size-fits-all approach to Homeland Security 
planning is neither appropriate, nor will it be successful, because of the diversity of needs 
of each jurisdiction. The IACP also is concerned about the competitive atmosphere that 
has been created in the quest for funding, and the impact that this has on collaborative 
efforts among all levels of government.  
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D. DISSEMINATION ISSUES 
One of the significant collaboration challenges is addressing the dissemination of 
sensitive information.  The government fears that sensitive information might be leaked 
to the wrong people, endangering national security. Fear of improper disclosure of 
information is understandable and pervades all information sharing collaborations, at 
least initially, when “outsiders” are let in. This concern increases when collaborations are 
extended to Homeland Security disciplines other than law enforcement, especially the 
private sector, because these other disciplines are viewed as not as having experience 
dealing with sensitive investigative or national security information, and they have 
generally not undergone the same level of background screening. On the other hand, the 
private sector also has concerns about sharing sensitive information with the government, 
fearing that confidential business information may be leaked to competitors or disclosed 
to the public. 
Withholding information for security reasons has its roots in the Constitution.  
Article I, Section 5, specifies that each house of Congress “shall keep a Journal of its 
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their 
Judgment require Secrecy.”85 Ever since, the nation has struggled over the proper balance 
between the public’s right to know and the need to protect national security and other 
legitimate interests. Moreover, in the “new normalcy” of a domestic terrorism threat, we 
have struggled over how to share information with Homeland Security stakeholders 
without compromising national security and public safety.  
The intelligence communities protect information according to two fundamental 
principles briefly mentioned in Chapter III: “need to know” and “right to know.” “Right 
to know” refers to whether or not a recipient of criminal intelligence information is 
legally permitted to receive the intelligence. For example, does the recipient have the 
necessary security clearance? “Need to know” is established if the intelligence 
information is relevant to the duties the recipient is empowered to perform. As an 
illustration, in the case of criminal intelligence, the question is will the intelligence assist  
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a recipient in anticipating, investigating, monitoring, or preventing possible criminal 
activity or is it relevant to protecting a person or property from a threat of imminent 
serious harm. 
When intelligence needs to be protected from unauthorized disclosure in the 
interest of national security, a specific degree of protection called “classifying” is 
utilized. Special classifications restrict dissemination to those who have passed a specific 
background investigation. Violation of these restrictions is a felony under federal law. 
The classifiers base the desired degree of secrecy upon their determination of the damage 
to national security that improper release of the information would cause. The resulting 
dissemination designation is referred to as a “security classification,” such as “for official 
use only,” “secret,” “top secret,” etc, and is discussed more fully below.86 
Persons called “original classifiers” do the actual classifying.  Original classifiers 
are designated by executive order and there are approximately 4000 original classifiers, 
with 800 of these being able to classify a document as “top-secret.” Once a document is 
“originally classified,” any document that draws upon that original document will carry 
the same security classification. This process of “derivative classification” leads to an 
exponential increase in the number of classified documents. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Classification/Declassification Historical View87 
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Classifying information has been the subject of much concern, both from those 
supporting the public’s right to know, and from those who feel important intelligence is 
not being shared. This has led some to feel there is a sort of “anti-epistemology” bias in 
the intelligence field.  There is a concern that in a “need and right to know” culture, 
intelligence is frequently needlessly classified; thus unnecessarily restricting sharing to a 
limited group who possess the necessary clearance.  
In particular, the law enforcement community has traditionally not been issued 
security clearances and consequently has complained loudly about the need to both issue 
more clearances, more quickly, and to produce intelligence with a “need to share” 
emphasis, i.e., not at a classified level whenever possible.88 Senior officials at the 
Department of Homeland Security concede, “The process of declassifying information 
takes too long and frequently prevents the department from quickly sharing concrete, 
actionable information with law enforcement.”89  
The WMD Commission has voiced a novel and provocative view of the 
information sharing and dissemination problem: 
The term information “sharing” suggests that the federal government 
entity that collects the information “owns” it and can decide whether or 
not to “share” it with others. This concept is deeply embedded in the 
Intelligence Community’s culture. We reject it. Information collected by 
the Intelligence Community—or for that matter, any government 
agency—belongs to the U.S. government. Officials are fiduciaries who 
hold the information in trust for the nation. They do not have authority to 
withhold or distribute it except as such authority is delegated by the 
President or provided by law.90  
The WMD Commission offers as a solution that we should move toward a culture 
of “stewardship” of intelligence information instead of ownership. They suggest that the 
DNI or the DNI’s designee should control access to such information.  
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As a baseline standard or norm, the DNI should require the submission of 
all intelligence information, with proper classification controls, to the 
Information Sharing Environment.91 Those who seek to exclude particular 
information from the environment must carry the burden of proving that 
such exclusion is clearly in the nation’s interest.92 
The WMD Commission’s solution may appear Pollyannaish when viewed in light 
of a “real world” application. The idea of the submitting all sensitive information to the 
trusted Information Sharing Environment as the arbiter of what should be restricted does 
not recognize the impracticality of having just one institution handle this workload.  For 
example, in 2004 alone, the government classified approximately 15.6 million original 
and derivative documents.93 The WMD panel would no doubt argue that this is exactly 
the point, and there will be fewer classified documents under their proposal.  However, 
the sheer volume of sensitive information to be processed for possible classification 
suggests the recommendation may be unfeasible. 
Another significant information-sharing challenge caused by security 
classifications is the lack of uniformity in classification labels and standards.  To begin 
with, state and local law enforcement use different categories from the federal 
intelligence community. State and local authorities generally use the following to protect 
information: 
• SENSITIVE 
• Information pertaining to significant law enforcement cases 
currently under investigation. 
• Corruption (police or other government officials), or other 
sensitive information. 
• Informant identification information. 
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• CONFIDENTIAL 
• Criminal intelligence reports not designated as sensitive. 
• Information obtained through intelligence unit channels that is not 
classified as sensitive and is for law enforcement use only. 
• RESTRICTED 
• Reports that at an earlier date were classified sensitive or 
confidential and the need for high-level security no longer exists. 
• Non-confidential information prepared for/by law enforcement 
agencies. 
• UNCLASSIFIED 
• Civic-related information to which, in its original form, the public 
had direct access (i.e., public record data). 
• News media information – newspaper, magazine, and periodical 
clippings dealing with specified criminal categories.94 
On the other hand, the federal government uses the following categories: 
• TOP SECRET information is information, which, if disclosed without 
authorization, could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave 
damage to the national security. 
• SECRET information is information, which, if disclosed without 
authorization, could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to 
the national security. 
• CONFIDENTIAL information is information, which, if disclosed without 
authorization, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the 
national security.95 
In addition to this tripartite system of classification markings, there is a fourth 
category “Sensitive, but Unclassified” for information that is deemed sensitive enough to 
require protection from public release, but falling short of the security classifications 
allowed under the executive orders. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
report found the inconsistent use of this fourth category was contributing to information 
sharing problems.  The GAO report found information-sharing barriers remain from a 
lack of government wide policies or procedures that describe the basis for when such 
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designations should be used, coupled with the fact that government agencies are using 56 
different designations for “sensitive but unclassified” classification, such as “law 
enforcement sensitive,” “confidential” and “for official use only,” to name just a few.96  




Ben Franklin’s warning to fellow colonists has been bandied about so much in the 
national counterterrorism dialogue the past few years that it risks becoming a platitude.98  
However, the fossil record of the national security and counterterrorism efforts in 
America tells an important story about the negative impacts these desirable “species” 
have, at times, had on civil liberties and privacy.         
The anti-terrorism struggle has reignited the national debate about civil liberties 
and privacy, but the quote attributed to Franklin may incorrectly frame the debate as an 
“either/or” contest that appeals to extremists in both camps but is unhelpful in 
understanding the larger context. In reality, when examined thoughtfully, the debate is 
not really between liberty or safety as Franklin’s quote implies; instead, the national 
deliberation is over the proper balance between security and liberty. Indeed, as Anthony 
D. Romero, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union recently agreed:  
“The task for all of us here has got to be to find a way to secure both goals, not to set up a 
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Faustian bargain where you're asked to give up one in the name of the other.”99  Also 
reflecting an awareness of the need to balance these two oft-competing goals was 
William Stephenson, the famous spymaster and the head of the Secret Service in Britain 
during World War II.  Despite the grave danger posed to Britain that justified a strong 
spy network, Stephenson cautioned: 
Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is 
an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, 
the most dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, 
revised, and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprise, the character and 
wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity 
of that guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure and prevail.100 
Recognizing the need to balance both competing interests bridges the political 
divide in contemporary American society. Republican Senator George Allen has warned, 
“And what makes us a great nation is that this is a country that understands that people 
have God-given rights and liberties. And we cannot—in our efforts to bring justice—
diminish those liberties.”101  On the other side of the aisle, Democratic Representative 
Marty Meehan concurs, “It is a delicate task to prevent terror while preserving the civil 
liberties that have long distinguished our nation. We must rededicate ourselves to finding 
a balance that both protects and empowers the American people.”102  
As our nation searches for the proper “reflective equilibrium,” regarding the 
liberty and security balance, the debate centers on three main areas.103  
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1. Profiling- where race, religion or ethnic background is used as a basis for 
some type of government action; for example, when an Arab or Muslim is 
singled out based solely on their religion or ethnic background for a search 
or a detention by a law enforcement officer.  
2. Privacy concerns- where an individual’s private affairs are potentially 
illegally or unreasonably subject to government scrutiny, such as the 
monitoring of international telephone calls.  And, 
3. First Amendment expression- where government actions may have a 
chilling effect on the expressing of First Amendment rights, including 
speech, assembly, and press, e.g., government monitoring or infiltration of 
a protest group might discourage participation in lawful protests. 
In response to these concerns, President Bush’s executive orders mandating 
increased information sharing and creating the National Counterterrorism Center contain 
provisions protecting privacy and other legal rights.104 Congress also addressed these 
issues when it passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). 
Congress included a provision that established a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board within the Executive Office of the President, charged with reviewing regulations, 
policies, and laws relating to counterterrorism to ensure that each of these takes into 
account privacy and civil liberties concerns.105   
Additionally, the President must report annually to Congress on the status of 
information sharing efforts. This report has to include the actions taken in the preceding 
year to implement or enforce privacy and civil liberties protections. Moreover, the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board must issue guidelines in consultation with 
the President to protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the 
Information Sharing Environment, including specifying the “means by which privacy and 
civil liberties will be protected.”106  
Even more significantly, the IRTPA requires placement of a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer in the ODNI, with a direct report to the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the IRTPA recommends, though does not require, that other intelligence 
entities do likewise.107  
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These privacy laws are federally focused, but they are important to state, tribal 
and local authorities to the extent that a collaborative national counterterrorism network 
of regionalized centers under federal auspices is created. Though most states, and many 
units of local government have laws designed to protect civil liberties and privacy in the 
collection of intelligence, other than the Constitution, the primary, and perhaps only, 
federal regulation of SLT intelligence collection is by 28 CFR Part 23. This law attempts 
to protect civil liberties and privacy by regulating the collection of intelligence into any 
federally funded database.  It is a lengthy code, but its core operating principles 
protecting civil liberties and privacy include the following: 
• A project shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information 
concerning an individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and the information 
is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity.  
• A project shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information 
about the political, religious or social views, associations, or activities of 
any individual or any group, association, corporation, business, 
partnership, or other organization unless such information directly relates 
to criminal conduct or activity and there is reasonable suspicion that the 
subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct or 
activity.  
• A project shall not include in any criminal intelligence system 
information, which has been obtained in violation of any applicable 
Federal, State, or local law or ordinance.108 
Finally, the Fusion Center guidelines, discussed in the next chapter, call for each 
center to develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy with “the 
capacity and commitment to ensure aggressive oversight and accountability so as to 
protect against the infringement of constitutional protections and civil liberties.”109 
However, similar to the IRTPA recommendation that other entities follow the 
requirements that establishing a privacy board in the executive office, the fusion center 
guidelines concerning privacy protection are voluntary. 
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F. MILITARY –CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SHARING  
It is not within the scope of this thesis to do an analysis of the complicated Posse 
Comitatus Act, but it is worth noting that the military has generally been prevented from 
performing a domestic law enforcement role since Congress passed the Act in 1878.  The 
law does not apply to the Coast Guard or the National Guard when called up by state 
governors, but Posse Comitatus effectively bars the military from assisting domestic law 
enforcement agencies in domestic intelligence collection. Since 9/11, there have been 
calls to modify the Act, but the prohibition remains, and with some limited exceptions, 
such as dealing with threats to the physical security of Defense Department employees, 
installations, or operations, the military is prohibited from gathering domestic 
intelligence. However, foreign intelligence that the enormous military intelligence 
apparatus gathers can be shared with domestic agencies, generally through the FBI.  
After 9/11, the Pentagon established Northcom, or Northern Command, in 
Colorado Springs to help in defending against attacks on the Homeland. Northcom has 
become an integral member of the homeland defense community as it provides command 
and control of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and coordinates defense 
support of civil authorities.  
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VI. EMERGING FROM THE PRIMORDIAL SOUP-THE ROAD 
TO COLLABORATION 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, only a relatively small number of 
counter-terrorism organisms, such as the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF’s), were 
dedicated to a multi-agency or multi-level of government approach.   The post September 
11 period is dramatically different. In response to unanimity that our previous counter-
terrorism efforts were grossly deficient, hundreds of millions of dollars have gone into 
creating new counter-terrorism organisms, such as Terrorism Early Warning groups, 
more JTTF’s, regional intelligence centers, analytical centers, and now fusion centers.  
Most of these new organizations were created to respond to a central theme of 
post-9/11 “what went wrong?” analysis, i.e., that information sharing and cooperation 
among all levels of the government and between agencies was a primary cause of the 
failure to prevent the attacks.110  As a result, most of these newly created organizations 
are centered around the theme of inclusiveness, i.e., they include representatives from 
multiple agencies, from multiple levels of government –state, local, and federal-- housed 
together for some specific counter-terrorism purpose, usually information sharing, and 
less often, investigations and operations.   
Another characteristic of the early efforts is that they were focused almost 
exclusively on law enforcement agencies. As we will discuss, with the passage of time, 
there has been a growing, and among some, perhaps a grudging recognition that it was 
not only the perspective of SLT law enforcement that was missing from the Homeland 
Security effort, but non-law enforcement perspectives were similarly omitted. 
Finally, these early efforts reflect an initial evolutionary step towards 
collaboration as almost all involve some co-location of personnel, following the example 
the military took to overcome barriers to collaboration. Co-location was forced on the 
military services in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. This Act 
addressed a seemingly implacable problem among the military services as inter-service 
rivalries prevented the different branches from working effectively together as a joint 
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team when conducting military operations.  In response, the Act created unified regional 
commands under one admiral or general, and the Act requires officers serve a tour 
assigned to a Joint Staff in order to be eligible for most high-level promotions. One of the 
principles promoted by the legislation was co-location to foster the building of personal 
relationships to help overcome barriers and broaden perspectives. While not a panacea, 
the Act is generally conceded to have significantly improved inter-agency understanding 
and cooperation. 
Goldwater-Nichol's intent--and its stunning accomplishment--was to drain 
the military's bureaucratic swamp. Today, the service chiefs direct the 
training, organizing, and equipping of their men--the management side. 
When it comes to fighting, they step back and let a unified commander in 
the field, advised by a newly empowered JCS chair, run the show: a 
simple idea with critical strategic ramifications.111 
In a similar vein, developing the capacity for interagency collaboration is critical 
for efficiently completing the routine tasks that law enforcement and other disciplines 
must “cooperatively” handle on a daily basis, e.g., power outages, mass casualties, fires, 
etc., as well as responding and improvising in the face of natural disasters and terrorist 
attacks.112 When the Anthrax attacks occurred shortly after 9/11, Dr. Gerberding of the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) admitted her staff had not achieved the “layers and 
levels of collaboration among a vast array of government agencies and professional 
organizations that would be required to be efficient and successful in the anthrax 
outbreak.”113 Another official conceded that the CDC lacked the established links with 
the FBI so that they did not even initially know whom to call.114 This problem has since 
been addressed, but it illustrates the problems of a “relationship deficit” when it comes to 
both preventing and responding to terrorism. 
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A. EARLY COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
1. Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
Perhaps the earliest domestic collaborative counterterrorism effort was the 
creation in 1980 of a Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City, consisting of eleven 
NYPD and eleven FBI agents.  A Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is a Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) led cadre of FBI agents, assorted federal agencies, and state and 
local law enforcement cooperation under the supervision of the FBI to share information 
and work on terrorism related investigations. As described by FBI Director Mueller, the 
mission of the JTTF’s “is to identify and target for prosecution terrorists and terrorist 
organizations planning or carrying out terrorist acts occurring in or affecting a geographic 
region and to apprehend individuals committing such acts.”115 
Subsequently developed JTTF’s vary in size and structure in relation to the 
terrorist threat dealt with by each FBI field office, with an average of forty to fifty people 
assigned full-time, and others assigned only part-time.116 The JTTF structure recognizes 
that each level of law enforcement brings different resources and perspectives necessary 
to do effective terrorism investigations. From an investigative point of view, there have 
been demonstrated successes of the JTTF model, one example being the successful 
investigation by the Seattle JTTF and resulting prosecution of James Ujaama for 
providing material support to al Qaeda.117 
The JTTF has also traditionally been the primary apparatus for terrorism 
information sharing between federal, state and local government (though fusion centers 
are quickly beginning to rival the JTTF structure as described below). JTTF’s provided a 
“quick-fix” after 9/11 since they were an already familiar structure and appeared to 
address a priority of developing federal and local partnerships to overcome the problem 
that information was not being shared between these levels of government, and counter-
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terrorism efforts were not being coordinated.  Prior to September 11, there were only 
thirty-four JTTF’s in the nation; now there are one hundred and one, more than four times 
the pre-September 11 number. The JTTF’s house 2,196 Special Agents, 838 state/local 
law enforcement officers, and 689 professionals from other government agencies 
including the Department of Homeland Security, the CIA, and many other federal 
agencies.118 
2. Terrorism Early Warning Groups  
The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, known as the LA-TEW, was 
the first domestic collaboration founded by local officials, and included some federal 
participation, but focused on state and local information sharing and fusion. The Los 
Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) established the TEW in 1996. LASD Deputy (now 
lieutenant) John Sullivan had the vision that there was a void in the greater Los Angeles 
area regarding information and knowledge about terrorism, as well as the capability to 
respond to a terrorist attack.  His solution was to establish an inter-agency, multi-
disciplinary group and process to increase awareness of local threats and consequences.  
Sullivan brought together police, fire, medical experts and psychologists, 
emergency management, the military, public health and others that would have the 
expertise to increase the opportunities for early warning of terrorist attack by using a 
“predictive intelligence” approach. The same group would provide, if an attack occurred, 
the technical expertise and intelligence support to incident commanders. The LA TEW 
model uses four key tools to accomplish its mission: Vulnerability Analysis, Threat 
Modeling, Indications and Warning, and Situation Awareness.119  
After 9/11, the LA-TEW served as the model for an on-going federally funded 
effort to expand this concept to other metropolitan areas in the nation. There are now  
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several TEW’s in various metropolitan areas, some having full-time members, others 
only liaisons. The National TEW Resource Center, which is funded in part by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, coordinates these efforts. 
Though not specifically referred to as a “fusion center,” the LA-TEW appears to 
have been the forerunner for what are now widely referred to as fusion centers. To what 
extent a TEW can be distinguished from a fusion center is debatable. It appears to have 
the characteristics of a fusion center, described below. It may simply be that the “fusion 
center” name designation has outpaced the development of the TEW acronym since the 
term “fusion center” was widely used by the military, and is more widely understood. 
One difference, however, may be that the LA-TEW model appears to be more focused on 
providing intelligence and technical expertise support to operational elements to prepare 
for and respond to attacks than are most fusion centers.   
3. Field Intelligence Groups 
One of the findings of the 9/11 Commission was that the FBI should build a 
stronger relationship with state and local agencies, in order to more effectively share 
information.120 Thus, in addition to increasing the number of JTTF’s, in 2003, FBI 
Director Mueller ordered the establishment of Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) in all 56 
field offices to serve as an intelligence focused arm for the FBI supporting the JTTF’s in 
particular, but also sharing with state, local and tribal partners.  
The FIG’s augment the primarily investigative responsibility of the JTTF’s with 
an intelligence capacity as part of the Bureau’s effort to transform itself into a stronger 
intelligence agency. As the primary intelligence group within the Bureau, the FIG’s 
manage the intelligence cycle within the field offices, a capacity that that did not exist 
prior to September 11.  The FIG’s don’t focus exclusively on terrorism; they also produce 
and disseminate intelligence on counterintelligence and criminal programs, such as gang 
interdiction. The FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence oversees the FIG’s, and most FIG’s 
contain intelligence analysts, special agents, linguists and other members of federal law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. 
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B. THE EMERGENCE OF FUSION CENTERS 
While it is recognized that federal efforts, such as increasing the number of 
JTTF’s, and creating FIG’s to support the JTTF’s, have improved information sharing, 
the expectations have evidently been too great and many apparently treated them as a 
panacea for the information-sharing problem when vehicles such as JTTF’s were never 
designed or resourced for this mission. For example, despite being the primary vehicle 
for information sharing with state, local and tribal officials, one year following the 9/11 
attacks, it was telling in that only a third of local law enforcement agencies reported 
interacting with the FBI’s JTTF’s, and this was confined mainly to larger agencies.121 
Despite the investigative successes of the JTTF model, both congressional investigations 
and private researchers have pointed out limitations in information sharing under this 
model. Further, as described previously, these were federally designed efforts. Under 
such a scenario, it is predictable that information sharing and other unintentional barriers 
to collaboration would remain. 
From a Congressional point of view, Senator Lieberman’s report on the state of 
information sharing in sum noted that despite improvements, first responders still did not 
systematically receive the information needed to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks, 
whether it is from the DOJ or DHS, and the information from locals still did not flow 
smoothly upward.122  Plotkin and Murphy identify several areas to improve including: 
lowering expectations of the JTTF’s, increasing resources, and improved 
communications, as many of the federal, state and local law enforcement officials 
surveyed pointed out that the JTTF needs to remain focused on investigations and still 
does not have anywhere near enough personnel to handle information sharing 
responsibilities on a wide scale.123 The studies and surveys also showed that the JTTF 
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model is hampered by the need for the SLT participants to have high-level security 
clearances, a process that can easily take a year or more.124 
A Markle Foundation task force research also revealed that the federal 
intelligence community does not fully understand the importance and relevance of 
information held in the non-federal levels of government.125 
Meetings with state and local officials and the private sector have led us to 
believe that the federal government has not yet realized the value of 
information identified by state and local entities. A system to integrate this 
information has not been developed. Much more attention must be paid to 
this gap, because we as a government are ignoring a critical component of 
national security. This must be done jointly with the Department of 
Homeland Security because it is partly the reason why that department 
was created. We know this is one of the toughest challenges facing the 
federal government, but it must be done.126 
Consistent with these described problems, the National Governor’s Association 
survey of state Homeland Security directors revealed a majority of the directors are still 
“somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the specificity and actionable quality of the 
intelligence their states receive from the federal government.” This survey occurred in 
2006 and surprisingly showed a sharp increase in dissatisfaction from a previous 
survey.127  
In response to the type of concerns voice by the Markle Foundation, the IACP and 
others, as well as reviews of the performance of the JTTF’s showing mixed success of the 
JTTF model as a cure for information sharing problems, there has been a focused effort to 
creating a more robust collaborative organism. Obviously, the JTTF model needed to 
evolve, or some other model needed to emerge to create more fulsome collaborations to 
tie together a greater number of participants than could participate in a JTTF. The 
alternative was to risk continued information sharing roadblocks. 
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Consequently, alternative counter-terrorism organizations have been proposed and 
are now being born into the Homeland Security family.  Moreover, as the Homeland 
Security community has identified strengths and weaknesses in our counterterrorism 
systems, and as we have identified new requirements caused by the changing threat 
environment of a dynamic adversary, we have changed focus and structure, moving from 
the JTTF as the primary information-sharing organism. 
The next evolutionary step from the JTTF model appears to be the “fusion 
center.”  The “fusion center” term is adopted from the military intelligence system where 
information from different sources was “fused” together. Fusion centers are designed to 
overcome the problems of the previous “top-down” approach. They are primarily a state, 
local and tribal adaptation, but most still contain federal participation in both design and 
implementation and are central locations at which SLT and federal officials work in close 
proximity to receive, integrate and analyze information and intelligence. “Fusion Center” 
is now the common term for what may also be called a “regional intelligence center,” 
“joint analytical center,” “coordination center,” “terrorism early warning” or some other 
related term. 
All of the multi-government level fusion centers developed to date appear to 
follow a “cooperative” fusion center model, with the JTTF’s and FIG’s co-located within 
one center along with state and local authorities, but retaining their distinct identities and 
supervisory structure. In a fully “collaborative” model, the federal, state, tribal, and local 
resources, including the JTTF’s, FIG’s, and other groups would be jointly governed and 
shared.  
Three of the earliest and well-regarded fusion centers are in Georgia, Arizona and 
Illinois.  Officials in those states all report tremendous satisfaction with the early results 
of their fusion centers.128 The satisfaction results from a reported marked improvement in 
both the fusing of information, as well as dissemination to key stakeholders.  Information 
sharing progress and a move toward greater integration of state, local and tribal (SLT) 
resources with federal efforts continues to be made as the fusion centers evolve. To 
illustrate, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) houses members of 
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23 state, local and federal agencies and maintains a 24-hour watch center with a terrorism 
hotline. In 2004, state police stopped a vehicle after a passenger was seen videotaping 
critical infrastructure in a suspicious manner. The officers contacted the fusion center, 
which learned that the driver of the vehicle was an unindicted co-conspirator in a case 
involving Hamas in Chicago. The MCAC then contacted federal authorities in Chicago 
who issued a warrant for the driver.129 
Challenges remain, however, and the National Governor’s Association report on 
fusion centers has identified four key themes in the research as obstacles to 
effectiveness:130 
• Legal limits and cultural differences among agencies can impede 
information sharing. 
• The role of the center must be decided early in the planning process. Will 
it play a purely analytical role, or will it also act on information?  
• The location of the center can affect its operations. Centers viewed as 
adjuncts to federal operations may enjoy only limited participation and 
cooperation by local officials. 
• Start-up, as well as long-term, funding is in limited supply but is essential 
for the success of state fusion centers. 
Despite these challenges, because the fusion center model appears to address 
many of the counterterrorism problems described in this and previous chapters, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have 
officially endorsed the recommendation that each state create a joint “fusion” center  that 
brings together the disparate entities involved in counter-terrorism collection.131 
President Bush noted this vision: “All across our country we'll be able to tie our terrorist 
information to local information banks so that the front line of defeating terror becomes  
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activated and real, and those are the local law enforcement officials.”132 State officials 
have clearly concurred as well with seventy percent of state Homeland Security directors 
listing the development of a state fusion center as their top priority.133   
There are now approximately 43 fusion centers in forty-one states, and over $380 
million dollars in federal grants have been spent in support of them.134 Federal officials 
hope to eventually have 70 fusion centers nationwide, providing a coast-to-coast 
intelligence blanket. Some focus exclusively on terrorism; others track all manner of 
criminal activity. The fusion centers developed to date have several common 
characteristics:135 
• Most centers include staff from multiple agencies at the state, local and 
federal levels; 
• The centers maintain clear and direct communication channels to field 
officers and policy makers; and 
• Centers are designed to be multi-purpose, focusing not only on terrorism 
prevention but also on fighting crime in general 
However, the 43 fusion centers have been developed independent of any 
coordinated federal guidance, and no national standards existed until recently to guide the 
design and implementation of the centers. Because the fusion centers have developed 
independently, there are several variations in their structure:136 
• Some centers only have analytical roles while others also have the 
personnel and capabilities to act on intelligence; 
• Some centers have a regional outlook; sharing information among states; 
others have a vertical structure, connecting states to local and federal 
agencies, but not other states; and 
• Some centers are contained within the federally led JTTF’s others are 
independent. 
None of this suggests that the JTTF or FIG has become a vestigial organ. In 
nature, vestigial organs are structures that were useful in ancestral species but have a 
                                                 
132 George Bush (Speech, FBI, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-5.html (Accessed January 17, 2007). 
133 2006 State Homeland Security Director’s Survey, 6. 
134 Sheridan. 
135 NGA Center for Best Practices Issue Brief, State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions 
(Washington, DC: National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices, July 7, 2007), 1. 
136 Ibid. 
71
greatly reduced or almost eliminated importance in more recently derived species.  In the 
case of fusion centers, the JTTF model still has tremendous importance, as per 
presidential directive, the FBI remains the lead investigative agency for terrorism, and the 
JTTF is still the primary mechanism used to carry out the investigative and 
counterterrorism mission described by Director Mueller. Moreover, the still developing 
Field Intelligence Groups are a vital intelligence resource to integrate into fusion centers. 
Thus, fusion centers are not designed to supplant JTTF’s and FIG’s; the opposite 
is true. The fusion centers species are an adaptation that grew out of the recognition that 
the threat environment required more than the JTTF organism was designed to provide. 
The ideal fusion center model integrates the successful aspects of the JTTF’s and FIG’s, 
i.e., the federal investigative and intelligence resources, with a broader set of DNA, e.g., 
other disciplines and components, and state and local participation in design and 
governance.  Indeed, in interviews across the country, one of the common threads was 
that the fusion centers viewed as most successful all integrated an existing JTTF as an 
essential part of their counterterrorism efforts, and there is an increasing trend to locate 
FIG’s in fusion centers as the primary federal intelligence component.137  
C. THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT  
Consistent with the disparate development of the multitude of independent fusion 
centers, a recent Markle Foundation Task Force report pointed out that despite the 
evolution of the fusion center model, the DHS had still not articulated its vision for how 
federal, state, local and tribal authorities would participate in a network.138 Responding to 
this and other criticism that not enough progress has been made at improving information 
sharing and integrating federal state, local and tribal authorities, and because of the 
positive reception to the initial fusion center effort, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 
recently outlined a new vision for a more collaborative and effective approach:   
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We are going to build upon some of our early initial efforts to establish 
fusion centers by creating a national network of intelligence fusion centers 
to support state and local decision-makers, chiefs of police, and state and 
local intelligence officials. We're going to build new information systems 
to further facilitate collaboration and sharing of classified and unclassified 
information, and to allow real-time working collaboration between state 
and local and federal law enforcement officials, including the ready 
transmission of classified information over secure communication 
facilities.139 
Secretary Chertoff’s vision originates from a mandate in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) calling for creation of the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE), as well as requiring designation of a Program Manager for 
the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). The ISE is an approach to facilitate the 
sharing of terrorist related information. It achieves this by establishing policies, 
processes, protocols and technology that enable the sharing of this information among 
federal, state, local, tribal and private sector entities, as well as our foreign partners.140 
The first and current Program Manager is Thomas McNamara, and he is responsible for 
overseeing the creation of an Implementation Plan.  
The newly released Implementation Plan contains some significant milestones on 
the road to reform. Under the Plan sent to Congress in late 2006, the Plan cites substantial 
accomplishments in information sharing. These achievements include revisions to 
existing policies and procedures, development of new policies, establishment of 
information fusion centers that include all levels of government, and fielding new 
collaborative capabilities and programs.  These programs allow ISE participants to 
implement systems, architectures, and standards to provide solutions for ISE users that 
enable them to access, share, and analyze terrorism information. However, the Plan also 
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and integration than exists today is needed. Specifically, the Plan finds that the current 
environment “does not consistently provide the optimal level of cross-community 
terrorism information sharing.”141  
Consequently, a primary goal in the Plan is to provide a robust information-
sharing framework that creates an integrated view for federal, state, local and tribal 
decision-makers and the private sector by giving them access to a broad spectrum of 
terrorism information to support “collaborative counterterrorism operations.” This 
primary goal translates into three main reforms that are especially relevant to our study:  
1. Creation of an Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group to 
coordinate information for SLT governments and the private sector. 
2. Designation of Fusion Centers as the focus point for SLT governments to 
share and receive information with the federal government. And, 
3. Promotion of a nationwide integrated State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Center network 
1. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
The crucial need for some entity, such as the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), to serve as a national coordinating body is still apparent nearly six years after 
9/11, perhaps even more so with the ever increasing number of fusion centers and other 
information sharing enterprises producing an ever increasing number of intelligence 
products. Recalling the earlier discussion about the “white noise” problem, there still is 
no mechanism to coordinate what funding and other competitive pressures have too often 
resulted in “bulletin factories” racing to be the fastest and/or most prolific.  Illustrative is 
a recent incident at the Port of Miami in which local and federal officials appropriately 
handled a suspicious incident, but the initial limited information that came out of the 
incident rapidly was circulated nationally without proper vetting among various 
information- sharing groups, including fusion centers.  Unfortunately, much of the initial 
information was wrong, including reporting that one of the subjects detained was on the 
Terrorism Watch List.  This inaccurate and widespread dissemination contributed to 
needless “spinning up” and another “cry wolf” scenario.142  In another example of a lack 
                                                 
141 Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, 10. 
142 David Ovalle, “False Alarm Tests Miami Port’s Security” Miami Herald, January 7, 2007, and 
interviews with multiple fusion center and Homeland Security officials, January 8-9, 2007. 
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of coordination and needless duplication of effort by scarce resources, in preparation for 
the 2006 Winter Olympics, eight of the sixteen federal intelligence agencies all produced 
and circulated arguably redundant finished intelligence products: independent 
assessments of the possible terrorist threat to the games that concluded the same thing.143 
However, even though the National Counterterrorism Center is perhaps best 
situated to provide national coordination of intelligence production, a major criticism of 
the NCTC is that it has served only federal authorities, and did not meet the needs of 
state, local or tribal law enforcement officials. Specifically, concern has been raised that 
the NCTC omits the participation of SLT officers who could use their perspective to 
identify and vet information that the non-federal community needed.144  
Responding to this criticism, the just issued ISE implementation plan states that a 
newly formed Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) will be 
collocated with the NCTC.   The primary purpose of the ITACG “will be to ensure that 
classified and unclassified intelligence produced by federal organizations within the 
intelligence, law enforcement, and Homeland Security communities is fused, validated, 
deconflicted, and approved for dissemination in a concise and, where possible, 
unclassified format.”145 Note that this does not specifically address how, if at all, state, 
tribal and locally produced intelligence will be handled. 
At the ITACG, federal departments and agencies assigned mission-specific roles 
will also provide terrorism information to facilitate the production of “federally 
coordinated” terrorism information products intended for dissemination to SLT officials 
and private sector partners. It is unclear what role state, tribal and local law enforcement 
will actually play within the ITACG, as the Plan appears to limit participation to 
representatives from DHS, FBI, DOD, and other “relevant Federal (emphasis added) 
organizations.”146  Further, the Plan emphasizes that, although it is going to be co-located  
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with the NCTC, the ITACG “will not be a part of the NCTC,” and it “is not intended to 
duplicate, impede, or otherwise interfere with the existing and established 
counterterrorism roles and responsibilities.”147  
Consequently, on several levels, the ITACG does not appear to address fully the 
concern that the NCTC is lacking in non-federal representation. Indeed, the Plan’s 
language refers to producing “federally coordinated” information instead of “jointly 
coordinated,” or more ideally, “collaboratively produced intelligence.”  Moreover, the 
“existing counterterrorism roles and responsibilities” that this Plan seeks to preserve, are 
exactly what critics have pointed out need to be changed. Currently, this is not a national 
center, it is a federal center, as it omits SLT authorities from the one place that by 
Congressional and Presidential intent is designed to serve as the primary organization for 
integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. 
This omission is especially glaring as the absence of SLT authorities is occurring at an 
organization that has as a mission statement “to inform, empower, and help shape the 
national and international counterterrorism effort to diminish the ranks, capabilities, and 
activities of current and future terrorists.”148 
2.    Fusion Center Focus 
ISE Program Manager McNamara has commented that state and local fusion 
centers “are a critical component of the ISE because they can dramatically enhance 
efforts to gather, process, and share locally generated information regarding potential 
terrorist threats and to integrate that information into the Federal efforts for 
counterterrorism.”149 This recognition led to the reaching of a major milestone in 
developing a national information-sharing network. The Plan states “Fusion centers will 
become the focus- but not exclusive focal points- within SLT governments for receiving 
and sharing terrorism information.”150 The Plan recognizes that there are fusion centers 
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associated with both “states” and “major urban areas,” and consistent with their 
respective roles and responsibilities, federal departments and agencies will provide 
terrorism information to SLT authorities primarily through these fusion centers. 
Reinforcing the point highlighted in an earlier section regarding the viability and 
importance of existing entities, the Plan emphasizes the fusion center collaborations will 
include the JTTF’s.151 
The Centers will have to operate consistent with the DHS/DOJ Fusion Center 
Guidelines, discussed below, and obviously with any relevant federal, state, and local 
regulations. To accomplish this goal, the Plan contemplates that the Centers will all 
achieve a baseline capacity level. This baseline is not defined in the Implementation Plan; 
that job appears to fall to the yet to be released National Fusion Center Guidelines. The 
Plan does not require a state or major urban area to establish a fusion center, and in those 
states that have multiple fusion centers; one will be designated as the primary statewide 
center to interface with the federal government. The federal government will then 
coordinate through this center to organize the gathering, processing, analysis and 
dissemination of Homeland Security information.152 
3. Integrated National Fusion Center Network 
In another important milestone, the Implementation Plan proclaims that the 
federal government will promote the establishment of a nationwide and integrated 
network of State and major urban area fusion centers to facilitate effective terrorism 
information sharing. To facilitate this network, the Plan calls for assigning 
representatives of federal organizations and co-location of personnel and resources 
whenever feasible; however, the Plan does not provide further details of the proposed 
network.153 Instead, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, along with the 
Program Manager of the ISE “are in the final planning stages of an effort to identify a 
State or regional Evaluation Environment” as a means of further developing the concept 
of a national network of fusion centers.  
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The ISE as currently proposed: 
 
 
Figure 5.   Figure-Information Sharing Environment as Proposed in 2006 
Implementation Plan 
 
The challenges faced in establishing an integrated fusion center network include 
both political and logistical challenges.  Politically, DHS has set up a battle by deciding 
that each state will have one “primary” statewide center with which the federal 
government will interface, and through which the federal government will coordinate the 
intelligence cycle as it relates to Homeland Security information in that state. In states 
that have more than one fusion center, such as California and New York, it remains to be 
seen how receptive local governments and major urban area fusion centers will be to this 
concept.  
The plan also defers details of how the actual network will be developed, other 
than reciting that DHS is in the final planning stages of an effort to identify a State or 
regional Evaluation Environment that would develop the concept.  Logistics of 
connectivity, as well as discussion of how such a network would be coordinated or 
directed are omitted.  Again, the political sensitivities in resolving the state versus federal 
versus local “control” are significant.  
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D. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
While it is axiomatic that the government has a role and vested interest in 
protecting critical infrastructure, it is widely believed that the private sector owns 
approximately 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure.154 In addition to their role in 
protecting much of our country’s critical infrastructure, private sector personnel also 
represent a vast potential resource and information sharing partnership to assist law 
enforcement in protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CI-KR). To provide 
just one example, it is estimated that there are almost two million private security officers 
deployed throughout America, many already directly assigned to protect CI-KR.155  
As a result, President Bush called for an active collaboration and partnership with 
the private sector in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), but 
challenges, including difficulties in overcoming information-sharing barriers, have 
inhibited full integration.  A recent year long study concluded that despite the emphasis 
placed by Presidential and Congressional mandates, the “capabilities, assets, and 
goodwill of the private sector to bolster our Homeland Security remain largely 
untapped.”156 In terms of information sharing, the report cited what others have noted as 
impediments: private sector companies worry about liability issues and information being 
leaked to competitors; similarly, government partners had difficulty sharing sensitive 
information because they feared it might be improperly disseminated.157 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is intended to respond to these 
and other concerns by providing the overarching framework for a structured partnership 
between government and the private sector for protection of critical infrastructure and 
key resources.158  These policies in the NIPP call for the formation of Sector 
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Coordinating Councils (SCC’s) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCC’s). The 
GCC’s and SCC’s are intended to have a synergistic relationship with the government 
councils providing interagency coordination of CI/KR strategies and activities by 
bringing together federal, state, tribal and local authorities to work with the private sector 
based SCC’s. The NIPP also strengthens the use of the Protected Critical Infrastructure 
Information Program (PCII).  
The PCII provides a framework, which enables members of the private sector to 
voluntarily submit sensitive and confidential information regarding their facilities, i.e., 85 
% of the nation’s critical infrastructure, to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
with the assurance that the information, if it satisfies the requirements of the PCII Act, 
will be protected from public disclosure.159 
The private sector has shown leadership in setting up information sharing systems 
independent of the government run programs. Well before 9/11, many critical 
infrastructure sectors had set up Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC’s) to 
share important security information regarding threats and vulnerabilities. While a 
presidential directive encourages the formation of ISAC’s and some of them receive 
government funding to facilitate their development, the respective sectors operate the 
ISAC’s, not the government.  
There is an ISAC Council to assist in the formation of ISAC’s, and the various 
ISAC’s are at different stages of maturity in the development of their programs. Each 
ISAC has unique challenges, but the ISAC Council’s own description best describes the 
desired collaboration: 
An ISAC is a trusted, sector specific, entity that provides to its 
constituency a 24/7 Secure Operating Capability that establishes the 
sector’s specific information/intelligence requirements for incidences, 
threats and vulnerabilities. Based on its sector focused subject matter 
analytical expertise, the ISAC then collects, analyzes, and disseminates 
alerts and incident reports to its membership and helps the government 
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ability for the membership to exchange and share information on cyber, 
physical and all threats in order to defend the critical infrastructure. ... 
whether caused by intentional or natural events.160 
 
SECTOR ISAC 
Agriculture and food  Food  
Banking and finance  Financial Services  
Chemical  Chemical  
Commercial facilities  Real Estate  
Drinking water and water treatment systems Water  
Emergency services  Emergency Management and Response  
Energy  Electric  
Energy  
Government facilities  Multi-State  
Information technology  IT Research & Education Network  
Telecommunications  National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications  
Transportation systems  Public Transit Surface Transportation (rail) Highway Maritime  
Table 4.   Operating ISAC’s, as of July 2006 
                                                 
160 ISAC Council White Paper, A Functional Model for Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing 
and Analysis Maturing and Expanding Efforts (ISAC Council, 2004), 5. Available at  
http://www.isaccouncil.org/pub/Information_Sharing_and_Analysis_013104.pdf (accessed January 7, 
2007). 
81
VII. EVALUATING EVOLUTIONARY PROGRESS 
There is universal agreement that there was a generally dismal state of affairs in 
the intelligence and domestic counterterrorism communities that led to the successful 
attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, and the resulting development of a plethora of 
counterterrorism reforms. What is subject to dispute, however, is the success of those 
reforms. There is much debate about how much further domestic counterterrorism 
structures need to adapt and evolve. For example, the pace of the progress on 
collaborative efforts is open to dispute. Deputy Director of National Intelligence Dr. 
Thomas Fingar would take issue with viewing collaboration as a needed evolutionary 
change. He recently posited that even though collaboration was central to bringing about 
the need for radical change in intelligence, the collaboration vision would likely frighten 
many in the profession because the present state required change that was more 
revolutionary than evolutionary. Dr. Fingar based this on the explosive growth of 
information, and the complexity of the analysis required by the broad number of 
stakeholders to deal with the terrorism threat.161 
Beyond just the pace of reform, there is a dispute about how successful the 
reforms have been. The previous chapters cite concern from a broad spectrum of 
observers and participants that there remain many failings in our domestic efforts to 
combat terrorism. On the other hand, since the enactment of some early reforms, there 
have been successes such as many domestic terrorism arrests and prosecutions.  
Most significantly, there have been no further attacks on American soil.  Does this 
by itself suggest that we have made the necessary changes and solved the failings in 
imagination, policies, capabilities and management identified by the 9/11 Commission? 
One conclusion is that the absence of attacks since 9/11 is a testament to the efficacy of 
our structural adaptations. Another conclusion is that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
simply have not decided to launch another attack. 
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While acknowledging that some progress has been made, the latest, and final, 
Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations generally gives a failing 
grade to our reform efforts.  In over half of the major categories, such as information 
sharing, creating a FBI national security workforce, and civil liberties protection, the 
report finds minimal or unsatisfactory progress some four years after 9/11.162 Similarly, 
the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, composed of former members of the 9/11 
Commission, gave the government wide information sharing reform effort a “D,” 
explaining that designating individuals to be in charge of information sharing, e.g., the 
DNI, is not enough to overcome still remaining information sharing barriers.163 
What are the appropriate metrics to measure our current effectiveness? The 9/11 
Public Discourse Project and most other reviewers who have studied counterterrorism 
changes and found serious problems remain have primarily relied on qualitative research 
and study. Their analysis is predominantly anecdotal, based on informed observation, 
case study reports, and random investigations rather than systematic quantitative 
evaluation. On the other hand, using quantitative data, the Department of Justice’s latest 
summary of the “war on terrorism”164 presents a much more sanguine view in its 
summary of the Department’s anti-terror record since 9/11. The DOJ website touts that 
the United States of America is “winning the war on terrorism with unrelenting focus and 
unprecedented cooperation.” The following are excerpts from the summary relating to 
domestic counterterrorism.165 
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• Our intelligence and law enforcement communities, and our partners, both 
here and abroad, have identified and disrupted over 150 terrorist threats 
and cells; 
• Five terrorist cells in Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle, Portland (Oregon), and 
Northern Virginia have been broken up; 
• 401 individuals have been criminally charged in the United States in 
terrorism-related investigations;  
• Already, 212 individuals have been convicted or have pleaded guilty in the 
United States, including shoe-bomber Richard Reid and “American 
Taliban” John Walker Lindh;  
• Over 515 individuals linked to the September 11th investigation have been 
removed from the United States.  
• Hundreds of suspected terrorists have been identified and tracked 
throughout the United States. 
• Our counterterrorism investigations have more than doubled since 9/11. 
• Our human sources of intelligence related to domestic terrorism have 
increased by 30% since 9/11.  
• 113 individuals in 25 judicial districts have been charged with terrorist 
financing-related crimes, with 57 convictions or guilty pleas to date.  
The danger in using statistics is of course that they are subject to different 
interpretations and use. As Mark Twain wrote in his autobiography, “Figures often 
beguile me, particularly when I have the arranging of them myself; in which case the 
remark attributed to Disraeli would often apply with justice and force: ‘There are three 
kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics.”166  
DOJ statistics have been analyzed by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC), a research group at Syracuse University, which has attempted to 
use an empirical approach for analysis of government programs.  TRAC’s quantitative 
analysis and related interpretations of the data have been controversial. In the data from 
the Department of Justice, 401 individuals have been charged in terrorism related 
investigations, and 212 have pled guilty or been convicted.167 TRAC’s data analysis, 
however, showed a surprisingly low amount of jail time for people convicted of what the 
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Justice Department had identified as “terrorism related crimes.” TRAC’s analysis showed 
the median length of sentence dropped from 41 months prior to 9/11, to 28 days in the 
two years after the attacks, to 20 days in the past three years.  
 
 
Figure 6.   Length of Jail Sentences for Terrorism Related Crimes – TRAC 
 
TRAC’s data also showed that the prosecution of international terrorism related 




Figure 7.   Number of Terrorism Related Prosecution - TRAC168 
 
Critics have used the TRAC analysis to question the success of domestic counter-
terrorism efforts. For example, Meredith Fuchs, general counsel at the National Security 
Archive at George Washington University, said the light sentences and drop off in 
prosecutions might mean that “we are catching people at the margins, not at the center of 
the plots,” and the drop-off in prosecutions can be interpreted that “either a lot of that 
post-9/11 activity was not necessary or that they haven’t identified key people or that key 
people in custody aren’t being prosecuted.”169  The Christian Science Monitor alleges 
that the Monitor’s independent review of the data found many of the cases had only 
tenuous connections to terrorism.  They cite the prosecution of a Kentucky 
businessperson labeled as a successful prosecution related to “international terrorism” 
who was convicted of lying about selling forklift parts to an Iranian truck manufacturer 
but who was sentenced to only 50 hours of community service and one year of 
probation.170   
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The Justice Department counters strongly that the TRAC report presents a 
“misleading analysis,” and by going after small offenses DOJ is able to disrupt potential 
plotters “earlier than if we waited for them to act first.”171 The DOJ also stated the report 
“relies on a faulty assumption that every referral from an investigative agency should 
result in a criminal prosecution and ignores the reality of how the war on terrorism is 
being conducted, particularly the value of early disruption of potential terrorist acts with 
proactive investigation and prosecution.”172 The DOJ recently issued a “white paper” on 
the national counterterrorism record, further explaining that, “Significant resources have 
also been devoted to the investigation and mitigation of threats, many of which may not 
result in criminal prosecutions. Our prevention strategy measures success not only by 
prosecutions brought and won, but also by threats disrupted and terrorist acts 
avoided.”173 
Professor David Carter of Michigan State University has noted that evaluation is a 
critical component to determine if our strategies are successful, but he argues, “Typically, 
superficial data are collected nationwide...  and are used as a barometer to measure 
program success. While these data provide insights on activity; however, they provide 
little insight on success.”174 
The simplest, but perhaps the most important, quantitative analysis would be to 
compare the number of attempted attacks versus the number of successes. For example, 
the Israelis feel that they have sufficient credible data to claim a success rate of 80% in 
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stopping suicide bombing attacks.175 In our analysis, we have very limited data for the 
number of attempts, but we know that there have been no successful attacks. Can the 
absence of attacks in of itself demonstrate the effectiveness of our reforms? Such a 
deduction would be a logical fallacy, a post hoc ergo propter hoc (coincidental 
correlation), in that we don’t know if the lack of attacks is due to the design of our 
domestic intelligence apparatus, e.g., improved and better-coordinated intelligence, or 
some other factor. Al Qaeda’s capacity to attack may have been sufficiently vitiated 
because of our foreign intelligence efforts by the CIA, or the Department of Defense 
efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere may have degraded al Qaeda’s capacity or actually 
interdicted plots. On the other hand, other, non-intelligence counterterrorism tactics, e.g., 
more border security, may have prevented attacks.  Finally, Al Qaeda may also thus far 
have simply decided not to attack.  Similarly, since in a free and open society no system 
can stop 100% of attacks, it would be wrong to deduce that a successful attack 
necessarily meant that our current intelligence structure was ineffective.  
Absent sufficient quantifiable data about the number of attacks that we have 
prevented, we are largely left with a qualitative approach.  For example, one useful 
starting point is to examine how we are performing in light of the National Security 
Strategy of the United States.  As the Strategy points out, the President signed the 
document with the expectation that “our vast intelligence enterprise will become more 
unified, coordinated, and effective.”176  The fifteen objectives of the Strategy provide a 
reference standard on the need for further change, and these strategic and mission 
objectives center on tailoring our intelligence and counterterrorism apparatus to the 
threats of the 21st Century.   
As detailed in the previous chapters, there are many who think that our efforts at 
reform have not addressed the fundamental problems with our domestic counterterrorism 
system, and our domestic counterterrorism efforts are not “united, coordinated and 
effective.” How much further change is necessary?  There is clearly a national consensus 
that the embryonic fusion centers are a primary organism to address some of the 
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remaining shortcomings, but the potential consequences of overconfidence in the efficacy 
of our reform efforts merit continued careful analysis and observation to ascertain the 
strengths and weaknesses in our systems, and that it remains a dynamic, not static 
process.  
In an effort to develop a more rigorous approach to evaluating Homeland Security 
efforts, including counterterrorism, in Section 312 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
Congress mandated the creation of the Homeland Security Institute (HIS). The HIS 
operates under the sponsorship of the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and 
Technology Directorate. Its objective is to use an integrated approach to evaluating 
Homeland Security systems and technologies at all stages of development, deployment 
and use. To date, as regards evaluating information sharing, HIS remains an unrealized 
tool, as it has not performed a comprehensive review of information sharing efforts. To 
date, HIS has focused on more specific elements of Homeland Security such as an 
independent assessment of DHS’s strategic framework for cargo security, Homeland 
Security risk assessments, and an Assessment of the Transportation Worker Identification 
Credential (TWIC) Program. 
In summary, the myriad of qualitative and conclusory findings in this and 
previous chapters share a common trait -- to view fairly the effectiveness of our current 
anti-terrorism efforts, one needs to evaluate the reform structures on a relative basis. 
Compared to the period prior to 9/11, we have made significant progress; nonetheless, in 
terms of our capacity to prevent future attacks, the analysis demonstrates that we have a 
considerable ways to evolve.  
In an “evo-devo” sense, after the shock of 9/11, our domestic counterterrorism 
organisms have emerged from the primordial soup and are walking upright with 
opposable thumbs, and have organized into bands and tribes, but what additional 
evolution is necessary is still open to debate. The evidence presented in the previous 
chapters reveals large information sharing gaps, a lack of coordination of efforts, and 
inefficient and ineffective use of scarce counterterrorism resources all plague our 
Homeland Security undertakings. Moreover, even if our current systems were operating  
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“at a high level of efficiency and effectiveness, there is a need for Homeland Security 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS- WINNING THE CO-EVOLUTION RACE 
In the pattern of co-evolution, both predator and prey evolve at the same time, 
both trying to adapt to the other. Applied to the counterterrorism arena, the number of 
jihadists is increasing, and the operational threat to the Homeland is also increasing as the 
global jihadist movement is spreading and adapting to our counterterrorism efforts, and 
continues to seek weapons of mass destruction.177 Terrorists are evolving new 
communication systems, new tactics and new weapons. In the theory of organic 
evolution, if a species does not adapt to changing environmental conditions, it becomes 
extinct—al Qaeda’s goal for the West. Thus, it is incumbent on us to ensure that our 
counterterrorism organisms evolve with the necessary adaptations for the new normalcy 
of the domestic terrorism threat environment. Consequently, the recommendations that 
follow in this chapter call for further significant reform in our domestic counterterrorism 
structures.   
Our evolutionary game plan needs to include more timely and complete 
information sharing, including better situational awareness, a broader and more effective 
collaboration of all key Homeland Security partners, including an expanded role for state, 
local and tribal governments and non-law enforcement disciplines. We also need to 
include greater confidence building measures to assure the American public that their 
civil liberties and privacy protections are not being traded away for security.  
These needs do not exist in a vacuum. They exist along side competing demands 
for scarce and, apparently, declining Homeland Security funds. One independent task 
force report estimates the shortfall for emergency responders alone is over 98 billion 
dollars over the next few years.178 Therefore, it is imperative that we address these needs 
in the most cost-effective manner. To achieve the desired efficiencies and crucial  
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effectiveness, we should combine and connect logical Homeland Security partners in a 
collaborative manner such that Homeland Security prevention and response capacity, 
whether to deal with a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, is maximized. 
A. FROM REDUCTIONISM TO HOLISM –ACHIEVING SYNERGY 
The nation’s nascent Homeland Security capability has benefited from the wide 
diversity of experiments and approaches to improve our counterterrorism capabilities. 
Our “national laboratory” of fusion centers, task forces, Terrorism Early Warning groups, 
and various other intelligence entities has provided a crucible for experimenting with 
different elements of counterterrorism to find the right mixture to meld a collaborative 
counterterrorism model. The result of this process is that we are clearly not starting at 
zero. We have been able to identify beneficial and detrimental elements. Nonetheless, the 
primary downside to this ad hoc approach is that we have yet to establish a truly 
collaborative effort that would achieve a high level of efficiency or high level of 
effectiveness. Nor have we marshaled our national counterterrorism resources into a 
network ready for the next time al Qaeda wants to test our mettle.  The ad hoc nature of 
the process has also created tremendous competition for funds and turf, creating a 
disincentive to collaborate.179  
Accordingly, based on the identified needs and available resources, we need to 
transition from this interim period of uncoordinated experimenting to a nationalized, not 
federalized, system.  In science, this might be referred to as moving from a reductionist to 
a holistic or synergistic model. “Reductionism” involves a focus on the individual parts.  
In our counterterrorism efforts, we have too often focused on exactly that—intelligence 
entities such as fusion centers that exist as stand-alone units or that are isolated 
“intelligence” centers, omitting other key disciplines or components. Conversely, 
“holism” is often defined by Aristotle’s famous statement: “The whole is more than the 
sum of its parts.” Jan Smuts, diplomat, philosopher and naturalist originated the term 
“holism” in 1926, when he set out what should be the framework for our future 
counterterrorism efforts: 
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Compared to its parts, the whole constituted by them is something quite 
different, something creatively new, as we have seen. Creative evolution 
synthesizes from the parts a new entity not only different from them, but 
quite transcending them. That is the essence of a whole. It is always 
transcendent to its parts…”180 
If we think holistically instead of parochially, we can achieve the necessary 
synergy to produce a more effective and efficient counterterrorism system. In adding 
“holism” and “synergy” to the lexicon of Homeland Security, we need to impart the 
essential qualities of these concepts if we want to develop collaborative counterterrorism 
models, not merely “coordinated” or “cooperative” approaches as described in Chapter 
V.   
On the other hand, synthesizing our experiences, resources and organizations into 
a collaborative, holistic approach is not a call to abandon experimentation, or to have a 
centrally dictated, top-down approach.  Instead, following our biology metaphor, it is a 
recognition that we need to end the “genetic isolation” that many counterterrorism 
organisms have experienced and have an “evolutionary convergence” of the best 
practices and characteristics of the various counterterrorism components, entities and 
disciplines into a true collaboration.  
B. HYBRIDIZING A COLLABORATIVE COUNTERTERRORISM MODEL- 
FUSING MORE THAN INFORMATION 
Nature has a variety of reproductive isolating mechanisms, such as seasonal and 
behavioral isolations, that prevent individuals of separate species from hybridizing since 
it is deemed advantageous for a species’ survival to prevent gene flow into its pool. Too 
often, our organizations have misguidedly felt the same survival instinct as they have 
fought to preserve or acquire turf, funding and prestige by isolating other levels of 
government, other agencies or other disciplines.  However, in order to develop a more 
efficient and effective counterterrorism organism that overcomes the problems identified 
in previous chapters, we need to overcome this reproductive instinct and recognize the 
benefits of hybridization.  A hybridization process for counterterrorism would involve 
combining the best traits of different entities into one collaborative effort.  One example 
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would be integrating the successful investigative resources of the JTTF model into a fully 
collaborative model that includes other key Homeland Security components and 
participants. This type of center, encompassing key local, state and federal resources 
from all of the Homeland Security disciplines, as well as the public and private sectors, 
would not only maximize the efficient and effective use of scarce resources, but would 
increase the prevention and response capacity of the national and regional counter-
terrorism communities.  
Of course, creating centers that are more effective is only half of the synergy 
formula; the other half is forming these centers into an effective Homeland Security 
counterterrorism network, but first we need to discuss the regional aspects of the 
network. 
C. R.A.D.A.R. CENTERS 
In keeping with Secretary Chertoff’s observation that intelligence is the “radar of 
the 21st century,” and in keeping with the benefits obtained from counter-terrorism and 
all-hazards resource collaboration, the Department of Homeland Security should establish 
Regional All-hazards Disaster and Anti-terrorism Resource (RADAR) centers.  
RADAR centers would be jointly governed, multi-disciplinary, and combine key 
anti-terrorism components of intelligence, investigations and operations with the broader 
Homeland Security all-hazards prevention, preparedness and response community.  DHS 
should establish a pilot RADAR center in region to serve as a national incubator to 
demonstrate and evaluate these benefits of a fully collaborative approach. 
1. Regionalism and Collaboration 
Because of the realization that disasters and terrorism impact regions, not just 
jurisdictions, the Homeland Security network should be built around regionalization. As 
stated recently by DHS Secretary Chertoff, 
We know that threats don't comfortably come confined to the political line 
drawing that describes what falls within one political jurisdiction or 
another political jurisdiction. Threats are risk-based, and the consequences 
of threats are region-based. And that means we have to look regionally at 
what we are doing to deal with risk. And of course, that was vividly 
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exhibited on September 11th and in Katrina, where the spill-over effect of 
an event in one jurisdiction was acutely felt in multiple other jurisdictions. 
So we've begun to look at regionalization as an important positive element 
in determining where we put money.181 
RADAR centers geographic coverage should encompass an area where effective 
operational control and efficient use of intelligence, investigations, and operations can be 
achieved. Towards that end, we should look to the work done by the Naval Postgraduate 
School and the Homeland Security Institute on finding common units of interest and the 
discussion regarding Capability Centers, Capability Clusters and Capability Contours. 182 
The essence of this work relates to finding logically related units of interest when 
assessing how to coalesce Homeland Security capability. 
As explained by its author, Sam Clovis, a capability center is any general-purpose 
jurisdiction where a capability (potential or actual application of skills and equipment to 
achieve an effect) can be joined with a professional area found in the idealized responder 
or prevention community. The community would then identify gaps and shortfalls that its 
own capabilities, inside that capability center, could not cover.  
In some situations, a jurisdiction would have to arrange with surrounding 
jurisdictions (other capability centers) to create a capability cluster in order to develop 
the appropriate response or prevention capacity. For example, a 24/7 Situational 
Awareness Center (SAWC) may be beyond the personnel and technical resources of a 
particular jurisdiction so that agency would team up with other capability centers to staff 
and equip the SAWC.  
It is also contemplated that there are certain desired response or prevention 
capabilities that a capability cluster may still not be adequate to cover. In that case, 
capability centers will have to consider capability contours that include those capability  
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centers and capability clusters that lie along lines of communication that can provide the 
needed assets.  These capability contours may well go across state lines and encompass 
vast areas of the country, especially in more sparsely resourced regions.    
The RADAR centers will thus have to be regionally designed in a “bottom-up” 
but horizontally integrated approach that takes into account the unique capabilities of 
each participating agency, along with other relevant considerations such as geography, 
politics, culture, and demography. 
2. Governance  
The myriad of information sharing issues described in this thesis frequently shares 
a common thread of a failure to collaborate among the different levels of government.  
Co-location and coordination of resources is beneficial but it does not achieve the full 
benefits of collaboration described in Chapter V and elsewhere.  To be truly collaborative 
will require joint design and governance of a RADAR center, with the accompanying 
mutual authority and accountability for success, sharing of resources and rewards. 
It becomes self-evident, then, that a successful counterterrorism model requires 
that the RADAR centers are multi-jurisdictional.  All levels of government-- state, local, 
tribal and federal-- have to participate. “Federal” includes more than the FBI.  DHS, 
including its key agencies, such as ICE, ATF, Secret Service, etc., must be part of it.  A 
special outreach needs to be made to tribal authorities that have traditionally been 
excluded from the process. Including tribal representatives in the design and 
implementation of a RADAR center may overcome this problem. 
Governance of multi-lateral, multi-disciplinary centers is one of the trickiest 
problems to solve; inter-governmental and inter-disciplinary rivalries for funding, 
prestige and control continue to impair our national counterterrorism efforts. The quasi-
military nature of the law enforcement agencies that participate in these centers also 
contributes to parochialism, as there tends to be a “chain of command” culture that 
promotes an agency specific focus. Finally, since the vast majority of the personnel at 
fusion centers are “donated” staff, still paid and employed by their parent agency, there is  
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a completely natural and understandable tendency for such staff to be focused on serving 
and meeting the needs of their parent agency.  This “sectarian” tendency can present a 
major barrier to collaboration.  
To overcome both the natural tendency to favor one’s home agency, as well as the 
more dysfunctional tendencies to battle for ego, prestige and resources, the RADAR 
centers should look to the non-profit corporate governance model. In a corporate model 
of governance, a board of directors governs the organization.  A board is a group of 
people who are legally charged with governance and the board is responsible for setting 
strategic direction, establishing broad policies and objectives, and hiring and evaluating 
the chief executive officer. The board of directors does not manage the day-to-day 
activities of the organization. Instead, the directors appoint officers who carry out these 
duties. 
The corporate board model recognizes the potential conflicts of interest that may 
exist among the board of directors. Therefore, the laws governing corporations require 
that a corporation is ultimately accountable to its owners –stockholders in the case of for-
profits and the public in case of non-profits. That accountability is accomplished by 
requiring that the Board of Directors of each corporation must represent the stockholders 
or the public. As a result, members of a governing Board have certain legally required 
duties, including duties of care, loyalty and obedience.  
In a RADAR center, a board of directors’ model would enable the governance 
structure to be comprised of representatives of the major stakeholders, but as a member 
of the board, each member would owe these fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and 
obedience, not to their home agency but to the public at large.  
Finally, if a RADAR center is going to foster a multi-disciplinary collaboration, 
the board needs to have representation from disciplines beyond just law enforcement 
groups. Since law enforcement agencies will likely provide the vast majority of resources 
in a RADAR center, it may be equitable for the various non-law enforcement disciplines 
to select one or more representatives to an executive governing board, and the remainder 
of disciplines collectively selecting a representative on an advisory board that makes  
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recommendations to the executive board.  This arrangement is especially appropriate for 
agencies, both law enforcement and other disciplines, which do not have full-time 
employees in the RADAR center. 
3. Multi-disciplinary -- Terrorism Early Warning  
As described above and elsewhere, there is a need to broaden the domestic 
intelligence and counterterrorism community beyond the law enforcement discipline. 
While law enforcement agencies have the specific responsibility to interdict terrorism, 
and thus form the cornerstone of intelligence, investigations and operations, a cornerstone 
is just part of the foundation. Public Health, Fire, Emergency Management, Utilities, 
Transportation, and Private Sector Security are examples of key players who need to be 
participants. Each of these disciplines is a both a consumer of counterterrorism 
intelligence and a partner in the entire intelligence cycle.    
For example, as described above, the CDC and Public Health would be on the 
front line of any WMD scenario, such as an Anthrax or other bioterrorism attack. This 
response role is widely recognized, but health professionals also need to be in the loop of 
predictive intelligence so they can be alert and prepared for potential attacks. Similarly, 
their frontline public health and medical positions makes them ideal collectors of 
potential terrorism related intelligence. Their knowledge would be crucial in analyzing a 
WMD threat scenario, in producing a finished intelligence product, and in the 
dissemination of information to support prevention efforts.  
The question is, however, how do you incorporate non-law enforcement 
disciplines in an effective manner?  Most fusion centers do not have full-time 
representation from other disciplines. The proliferation of multiple centers may further 
limit the availability of representatives.  Consequently, a regional center approach, in 
which disciplines could “share” a representative, will make the participation of non-law 
enforcement disciplines more feasible.  Additionally, making these other disciplines full 
partners by including them in the governance structure on the proposed executive 
governing board and advisory boards, would increase their investment, maximizing the 
likelihood their participation would be more fulsome.  
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Based on the LA-TEW model, a Terrorism Early Warning group (TEW) can 
provide a place within the RADAR centers to house a multi-disciplinary working group 
to identify trends and assess potential threats. Because of their multi-disciplinary nature, 
such groups are well suited to provide the expertise to create “target folders” that assess 
potential targets of terrorism, establish common response protocols, and assist in mission 
planning, incident management planning, and allocation of resources before and during 
actual events.  
A Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program within the RADAR centers would 
complement the TEW by providing points of contact within each agency in the various 
Homeland Security disciplines. These specially trained and screened TLO’s would 
provide a conduit for multi-lateral information sharing—to and from the TEW, and to and 
from the various agencies in the TLOs’ respective sectors and disciplines. This also 
addresses the situations where full-time participation by a particular discipline or agency 
in a RADAR center is not feasible. 
The TEW’s can also be an effective vehicle for bringing successful public private 
partnerships into the RADAR centers. For example, the Pacific Northwest Economic 
Region (PNWER), is a public/private partnership composed of legislators, governments, 
and businesses consisting of five states (Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Idaho, and 
Montana) and three Canadian jurisdictions (British Columbia, Alberta, and The Yukon 
Territory), and is perhaps the premier example of an extant public-private collaboration.  
PNWER has designated nine business and industry sectors within the PNWER 
jurisdictions and developed proactive working groups for each sector. As an illustration, 
the Homeland Security Working Group incorporates a regional partnership for 
infrastructure security, which focuses on security issues in the United States and Canada. 
One of its major emphases has been on critical infrastructure protection, focused 
especially on the interdependencies of the region's critical infrastructure. 
The other partnership that should be integrated in the RADAR centers are the 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC’s) described in Chapter VI and 
representing the major critical infrastructure and key resources of our nation. Many of the  
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ISAC’s already have a robust information sharing capacity and would provide an ideal 
vehicle to integrate non-law enforcement disciplines, especially the private sector 
participants, into the RADAR collaboration. 
Lastly, the military discipline needs to be involved in the RADAR centers. This is 
not to suggest that Posse Comitatus issues be raised by involving the military in domestic 
intelligence collection or other law enforcement activities; however, Northcom’s civil 
support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, 
hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Northcom’s mission also includes counter-drug 
operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of 
mass destruction.  
Equally important is that Northcom has the responsibility to provide for homeland 
defense in the event of an attack. To accomplish this mission, Northcom has substantial 
intelligence capabilities to monitor these threats.  Currently, should Northcom develop 
intelligence about an imminent attack that intelligence would have to flow through many 
bureaucratic layers before it would be relayed to local and regional officials, who might 
be in the best position to interdict and who certainly would be the first responders to the 
scene. These layers inhibit timely, complete and accurate information sharing. The delays 
and layers are unnecessary, and may have catastrophic consequences.  Likewise, if SLT 
officials develop time sensitive information that would be crucial to Northcom to defend 
the Homeland, it too would have to pass through so many layers before it reached 
Northcom that it may be too late to prevent an attack. 
Consequently, in order to ensure timely, complete and accurate sharing of 
homeland security information with the military, we need to remove the extensive layers 
of bureaucracy.  This can be accomplished by either placing Northcom liaisons in 
RADAR centers, or where this is not practical, establishing a virtual two-way 24/7 
connectivity. 
4. Co-location and Collaboration 
We have discussed the advantages of a TLO program for extending the reach of 
partnerships to agencies who cannot assign individuals to the RADAR center; however, 
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personnel and resources should be co-located whenever feasible. Co-location can be 
pivotal to overcome barriers to collaboration. Co-location enables the “shared space” that 
Michael Schrage argues is indispensable to collaboration. As he puts it, “If you don't 
have a shared space you're not collaborating. One of the tests of a shared space is whether 
it's an invitation to innovation. Is it creating opportunities for other people to add 
value?”183  
Thus, establishing “routine” interactions in a RADAR center between and among 
all of the Homeland Security disciplines, rather than meeting on the “battlefield” when 
there has been a disaster or attack, will build the “collegiality, trust, flexibility, openness, 
mutual respect, social capital, and pathways of communication” that Hocevar, et al, have 
identified as necessary for collaboration.184 This can also be thought of as the “social 
capital” problem—determining how trust is “built, maintained, and used in a multi-
agency, multi-level environment.”185  
Where co-location is impractical, information sharing and cooperation can be 
accomplished to lesser extent by technology advancements, such as video and other 
secure communication networks. Of course, as the point has been made, cooperation is 
not collaboration. To achieve a “shared space” virtually and to collaborate in a “virtual” 
sense is difficult, but there have been some advances. The Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES) was a very successful partnership involving the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and major local police intelligence units, which were connected via a 
secure virtual private network. JRIES was more than just an information sharing 
cooperative mechanism because it contained a collaborative software tool called 
“Groove.” Groove created a collaborative space where organic conversations, requests, 
postings, idea sharing, etc., could easily take place, both on an extended and real-time 
basis.  
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Many of the collaborative aspects of JRIES collapsed when DHS took it over and 
expanded it into the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). As HSIN, the 
membership was increased to thousands of users in many disciplines, and the Groove 
software was removed due to technical limitations of the software to support this huge 
number of users. The sheer size of the membership and the absence of the Groove 
collaborative space impaired the previous collaborative nature.  While HSIN can still 
function as a national information sharing system, the JRIES’ executive board, which 
includes intelligence directors from New York City, Washington, and Los Angeles, broke 
off discussions with DHS and ended the effort to assimilate the system into the HSIN. 
The board is attempting to reconstitute JRIES along its original lines.186 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has done considerable 
research on establishing a pilot virtual capability for counterterrorism centers to provide 
virtual collaborative spaces, including but not limited to two-way information sharing and 
virtual analysis spaces. This encompasses focused research from PNNL’s National 
Visualization and Analytics Center work on cooperative analysis, as well as enabling 
users to define their own operating picture from a common operating picture that 
participants in a RADAR center would share. As explained by PNNL’s Dr. Steve Stein, a 
virtual capacity in a RADAR type center would have two-way information sharing based 
on a secure and resilient system with analysis produced by a team of core resident and 
virtual analysts from local, state and federal homeland security disciplines. They would 
share a largely virtual database to enable integration, assessment, and secure, tailored 
dissemination of information provided to key stakeholders.187An organization such as 
PNNL should be enlisted as a technology facilitator within a pilot RADAR center to 
serve as a national test bed for developing this virtual capability and other 
counterterrorism technologies.   
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5. Subject Matter Coverage 
The subject matters covered in a RADAR Center should address an “all-hazards” 
and “all crimes approach.”  
a. The “All Crimes” Approach 
A RADAR center needs to be able to address the broad array of crimes 
that may facilitate terrorism or threaten Homeland Security. The “all crimes” focus on 
potentially terrorism related offenses is an integral part of a terrorism prevention strategy. 
This approach allows disruption of potential terrorist acts by arresting and prosecuting 
potential terrorists and their facilitators and supporters without waiting for a difficult to 
detect terrorism crime, or worse, a successful terrorist attack. An important caveat is that 
the RADAR center must ensure that those prosecutions labeled as “terrorism related” are 
carefully scrutinized in order to avoid unfairly and inaccurately labeling someone as a 
terrorist or supporter.  
The “all-crimes” term can also be misleading, as no Center can ultimately 
be effective without a sharp focus.  Every fusion center has limited resources and cannot 
afford a scattergun approach.  Moreover, the funding that is supporting many of these 
centers, especially the analysts, is designed to support Homeland Security. There was 
considerable resistance to allow Homeland Security funds to be used for personnel costs.   
One of the fears was a misuse of the personnel to supplant local funding responsibilities 
for general law enforcement responsibilities.  To the extent that Homeland Security grant 
funds are used to address non-Homeland Security general crime problems, such misuse 
would not only constitute a violation of the grant requirements, but would also undercut 
the tenuous support for personnel funding. The fusion center guidelines aptly describe the 
proper focus as being on crimes that have a “potential national security implication.”188 
Examples of criminal activity that have an interrelation with terrorism and threaten 
Homeland Security are certain types of organized crime and gangs. Without a national 
security nexus focus, with the enormous crime problems that our communities face, and 
the fading public interest in counterterrorism, we risk our fusion centers becoming “all-
crimes but terrorism.”  
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b. “All Hazards” 
The “all hazards” method acknowledges the reality that the threat of 
natural disasters and hazards, such as earthquakes, hurricanes and pandemic flu is much 
more likely than a terrorist attack, at least for the present. It also recognizes that the same 
structures that we use to prepare to respond to and mitigate “all hazards” provide a 
framework for responding to and mitigating the impacts of a terrorist attack. Thus, if we 
build capacity to respond to natural disasters, we will at the same time increase our 
capacity to deal with intentional disasters. Additionally, the partnerships and 
collaborations we develop for these natural disasters, e.g., public health and law 
enforcement preparing to deal with pandemic flu, build the social capital to collaborate 
on information sharing to prevent terrorism. Finally, there are efficiencies that “clustering 
capabilities” such as situational awareness centers, analytical groups, etc., can achieve by 
sharing capabilities in everyday natural disaster planning and preparation. 
6. Component Groups 
As outlined in Chapter III, a RADAR center needs to fuse more than just 
intelligence. Effective counterterrorism relies on the synergy that arises from the 
counterterrorism triad.   To be effective and efficient, as well as garner short and long-
term support, a RADAR center needs to have a robust program containing three principal 




Figure 8.   RADAR Center Component Groups 
 
a. Intelligence and Investigations Components 
To achieve the desired synergy, Intelligence, Investigations and 
Operations should be placed under one governing structure, and ideally, one roof. Jointly 
coordinating the counterterrorism triad in one center allows for the most efficient 
information sharing among these critical counterterrorism components. It also allows for 
the coordination and focusing of efforts that are difficult to achieve when these 
components are housed separately, especially under different chains of command. 
Intelligence and Investigations would each include the logical subgroups 
of terrorism, and crimes with a national security implication, e.g., certain types of 
organized crime, and gangs, with the Intelligence component also containing a regional 
crime analysis component to identify region-wide crime groups or patterns that may have 
a nexus to homeland security. Other Intelligence sub-groups might typically include 
Special Events support analysis and Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Protection 
groups. 
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b. Operations Component 
Additionally, to meet the needs of the RADAR region in an efficacious 
manner, the Operations component should house a 24/7 Situational Awareness and 
Watch Center (SAWC).  This will enable the region to have real time awareness and 
connectivity with international, national and regional partners.  Whether it is information 
from Interpol about a bombing in London, or information from a traffic stop in the far 
reach of the RADAR center’s area, to maximize the chances of preventing an attack in a 
region, a center needs to have this level of awareness.   
Additionally, the SAWC component of a RADAR center will be able to 
provide real-time support to field units throughout a region. Along the lines of the 
recently created New York Police Department’s Real Time Crime Center, or Washington 
DC’s Support Operations Center, this access to information will enable a RADAR center 
to provide immediate support and two-way information sharing to field units, such as 
patrol officers, detectives, firefighters, health officials, etc.  In the event of an actual 
attack, the 24/7 Situational Awareness and Watch Center will also be able to provide the 
real time connectivity and support to first responders and Emergency Operations Centers 
in the region. 
Integrated with the Operations’ SAWC will be the capability to send out 
Field Response Units from a RADAR center’s investigative and intelligence components 
to support officers in the field with potentially terrorist related incidents and 
investigations, e.g., a stop of suspect on the Terrorism Watch list. 
Finally, the Operations component will address the significant problem 
with enormous Homeland Security dollars being spent on highly technical equipment that 
is duplicative because individual entities, i.e., capability centers throughout the region 
are separately purchasing, operating and maintaining it. This problem is exacerbated by 
the lack of personnel at each entity to effectively maintain and deploy such equipment. 
Using the capability cluster concept, a regional, RADAR based, Technical Support unit 
would be able to support the technical needs of both the Center, as well as have the 
expertise and equipment to supplement regional needs in a more efficient manner. A 
tremendous example is the technical support capability achieved by housing a regional 
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computer forensics capacity in the Arizona Counterterrorism Intelligence Center 
(ACTIC). ACTIC demonstrated that it is immensely more efficient to have its center staff 
a small cadre of experts from multiple entities who purchase the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars worth of computer forensic equipment and then certify agency representatives 
who can come to their center to use the equipment on an as needed basis.  This eliminates 
wasteful duplication of expensive equipment that has a short obsolescence cycle, and 
allows smaller jurisdictions to develop a forensic capability that they could never achieve 
on their own. 
7. “Primary” versus “Secondary” Centers 
DHS cannot ignore the political realities of the battle between major urban areas 
and states over control of resources and funding, and the Information Sharing 
Environment Plan recognizes that both entities may potentially have fusion centers. 
However, the Plan also states that each state will have a “primary” fusion center serving 
as the central interface point with the federal government for that state. This is setting up 
a battle in states that have more than one fusion center. For example, in New York State, 
will the federal government’s primary interface be limited to NYPD’s impressive fusion 
center or the also impressive Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center 
(UNYRIC)?   
While DHS is rightfully concerned about sustainability and about the ability to 
provide a base-line level of support to the ever-growing number of fusion centers, 
designation of only one center is again a “top-down, one size fits all,” federal centric 
approach. Instead, DHS should let the RADAR centers arise as a natural outgrowth of the 
local organic conditions, including culture, demographics, resources, etc. DHS should 
recognize the regional benefits of the regional capability clusters process described 
above versus a geographic based approach.   
It may be appropriate to have only one primary fusion center in some states; 
however, it may be appropriate for some areas to have more than one fusion center that 
interfaces directly with the federal government.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
well-respected National Capital Region Intelligence Center located in Fairfax County 
Virginia.  Because the regional partners formed this center according to their capabilities 
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and regional needs, it encompasses Homeland Security groups from Virginia, Maryland, 
and Washington DC. The critical assets and high threat of this area make it appropriate 
for this fusion center to be designated to interface directly with the federal government, 
as well as the Virginia and Maryland state fusion centers. 
As another example, most observers would agree that both the Los Angeles Joint 
Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC) and the State Terrorism Threat Analysis Center 
(STTAC) in California have an equal need to interface and coordinate directly with the 
federal government. As previously described, LAPD Chief Bratton has already voiced 
serious concern about the timeliness of information sharing with the federal government. 
Adding a layer to “interface” or coordinate with will likely exacerbate this problem. We 
need to remove as many layers as possible to allow for the most timely two-way 
information sharing and related responses. Technology, training and a commitment to a 
multi-lateral approach certainly make it feasible to interface directly with more than one 
center.  
D. A NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM NETWORK 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 calls for strengthening information 
sharing and collaboration capabilities by establishing prevention frameworks “based on 
expanded regional collaborations that are linked in a national network.” Moreover, the 
Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan calls for the establishment of a 
nationwide and integrated network of State and major urban area fusion centers to 
facilitate effective terrorism information sharing, but the Plan does not provide details of 
how such a network would be constructed. DHS and the ISE Plan indicate that they are 
still in the final planning stages of an effort to identify a State or regional Evaluation 
Environment that would develop the concept of a network.  
The proposed RADAR centers, interconnected within a National 
Counterterrorism Network (NCN) would provide the environment described in the ISE 
Plan to develop a network.  The NCN will consist of the RADAR centers, connected 
horizontally with other RADAR centers, and vertically integrated with the National 
Counterterrorism Center. Depending on their needs and capacities, some smaller 
RADAR centers might coalesce into a capability cluster of a Super RADAR center.  
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The National Counterterrorism Network and RADAR centers will both lessen 
information sharing problems, such as dissemination issues, and provide the requisite 
auspices and access to international and national counterterrorism intelligence and 
resources that the various RADAR centers will need to be effective. This will provide a 
National Counterterrorism Network consisting of RADAR centers protecting the 
nation in a concentric approach, with the common “center” being the NCTC for terrorism 
related issues.   
 
 
Figure 9.   Potential RADAR center cluster within a National Counterterrorism Network 
 
To facilitate timely, complete and accurate information sharing, both RADAR 
and Super RADAR centers need to be under the auspices of some entity that has the 
national standing to establish and enforce information sharing standards, certifications, 
technology protocols, etc., and have the resources to coordinate this national effort.  
Fortunately, two entities are ideally situated to meet both the terrorism and “all-hazards” 
networking and support needs of the RADAR centers: To handle the terrorism aspects, 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), to handle the “all-hazards” aspects, the 
National Operations Center’s National Coordination Center (NCC).  
110
The terrorism portion of the RADAR centers will operate under the auspices of 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is the proper entity since it has 
the national mandate to coordinate all domestic terrorist related information and 
operations. Also with the interrelated Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
Group, the NCTC is already designated to perform an information coordination function 
nationally. The RADAR centers must, for timely and accurate information sharing and 
situational awareness, be able have two way sharing directly with the NCTC.  The NCTC 
will be responsible for horizontal sharing with the NOC and other federal and 
international agencies of terrorism related information from the RADAR centers. 
To lessen the problems of circular reporting and the “white noise” problem from 
overproduction of “unfinished” intelligence products, should time allow, all RADAR 
centers will be encouraged to send bulletins and other reporting information to the 
NCTC’s Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) for vetting 
and dissemination to the other components of the NCN. The ITACG will be jointly run 
and staffed by a co-equal arrangement of state, federal and local representatives. This 
revolutionary step will represent a quantum leap forward in the national intelligence 
cycle, ensuring that all Homeland Security intelligence is sent to one location. It will not 
replace the intelligence cycle efforts at the RADAR centers, but will enable for the first 
time a nationalized intelligence cycle of needs identification, collection, analysis, 
reporting, dissemination and feedback.    
The “all-hazards” portion of the RADAR center will function under the auspices 
of the National Operation Center (NOC) and its accompanying National Coordination 
Center, enabling information sharing and situational awareness of natural disasters. For 
example, the reporting to the NOC will enable the NOC to disseminate the information to 
the remainder of the NCN, while the National Coordination Center addresses response 
and recovery coordination.  Since the centers are “all-hazards,” and since FEMA’s 
mission within DHS is to lead the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and 
effectively manage federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident, 
both RADAR and Super RADAR centers should be administratively “be placed” in the 
existing FEMA regions for purposes of coordination and support of the all-hazards 
intelligence functions of the centers. 
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Figure 10.   FEMA Regional Offices 
 
However, this is not to suggest that the individual RADAR centers have to report 
through the layer of the FEMA region to share information with the NOC.  Should a 
RADAR center or the NOC deem it advantageous to communicate directly versus 
coordinating through the FEMA region, either entity may do so. This is also not to 
suggest that the RADAR centers will replace existing emergency operation centers 
(EOC) or FEMA’s role.  EOC’s will continue to be the physical locations where 
organizations come together during an emergency to coordinate response and recovery 
actions and resources and manage incidents. However, effective coordination and 
management of incidents will require timely and accurate intelligence. The RADAR 
centers will provide this intelligence support.  For example, in the event of a pandemic 
flu, the significant analytical capability of a RADAR center could be put to use to 


















Figure 11.   Proposed National Counterterrorism Network 
 
E. PERSONAL PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION 
The capabilities of the counterterrorism and intelligence communities will be 
enhanced if these recommendations are enacted and a National Counterterrorism 
Network is created. This positive development should correspondingly be matched with 
an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect our civil liberties and privacy. 
Additionally, to realize its full potential, a RADAR centers and the National 
Counterterrorism Network will need the full participation and support of the broad 
array of proposed partners, including the American public. They will further need the 
support of policymakers for funding and other resources. Policymakers across the 
political spectrum and the public have expressed concern about the possible erosion of 
privacy and civil liberties in the name of security. Washington DC Chief of Police Cathy 
Lanier warned that even though fusion centers are becoming common, navigating the 
various state and federal privacy laws put us in a precarious position, warning about the 
possible loss of community support should civil liberty concerns not be addressed.189 
                                                 
189 Sheridan. 
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Thus, to earn the public’s trust, the protection of personal privacy and civil liberties have 
to as fundamental to a RADAR center and the National Counterterrorism Network as 
the promotion of information sharing. This underscores the need and benefit of enforcing 
national standards. 
Fortunately, the contemporary Homeland Security community brings with it a 
proven commitment to the twin pillars of security and liberty. To cite just two examples, 
Public Health operates within strict medical privacy regulations, and the Law 
Enforcement community carries out its responsibilities under a sworn oath to uphold the 
Constitution. Thus, it is fully expected that all RADAR participants will bring with them 
an inherent respect and commitment to constitutionally sound anti-terrorism procedures, 
and they will fully comply without hesitation with all applicable federal, state and local 
privacy protections. However, those good intentions are not sufficient. History has shown 
that even well intentioned advocates may unintentionally transgress. Thus, privacy and 
civil liberty protections must be as robust as the anti-terrorism and analytical systems. 
This will entail both oversight and transparency.  
Oversight should be modeled on the IRTPA requirements for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. The NCN and RADAR centers should implement the 
recommendation in the IRTPA to emulate the requirement of a Civil Liberties Protection 
(CLP) Officer who directly reports to the Centers’ directors. This person would also work 
in conjunction with a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, again modeled on the 
IRTPA requirement for such a board to be established. The Oversight Board would report 
to the Executive Governing board of the Center.   
In providing oversight, the Oversight Board would be charged with reviewing 
regulations, policies, and laws relating to counterterrorism to ensure that each of these 
areas takes into account privacy and civil liberties concerns, while the CLP Officer 
monitors day-to-day specific activities.  The Board and the CLP Officer would also fulfill 
an advisory role to RADAR participants and managers, e.g., in participation in 
interpreting and implementing legal requirements for protecting privacy.  
Both the public and the RADAR center participants must have confidence in the 
Board and CLP Officer. To inspire this confidence, those filling these positions must 
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have the necessary reputation, education and experience, as well as proper clearances, to 
monitor anti-terrorism efforts for compliance. The Board should include a member of the 
public, such as a former judicial officer, along with legal officials not directly associated 
with the Center.  The Board and CLP Officer should issue publicly available reports on 
the Center’s successes and failures to implement protections for and promotion of civil 
liberty and privacy, along with remedial actions. The Board and CLP Officer should 
serve as a sounding and review board for those with concerns related to these areas. 
Neither the Board nor CLP Officer would have authority over any aspect of the Center.  
Their effective “power” comes from the reporting role that their reports play in informing 
the Center directors, judicial and prosecutorial officials (in the case of misconduct), 
legislators and executives who can implement reforms, and finally, the public. 
RADAR centers and the NCN design must overcome the cognitive hurdle of the 
natural reluctance some elements, such as the intelligence component, will have towards 
the transparency needed for public confidence. Transparency does not require 
compromising the counterterrorism triad.  It can be accomplished via confidence building 
measures such as public outreach and education about the operation of the centers.  As 
just one example, the CIA and FBI have demonstrated that websites can be used to solicit 
crucial information, educate the public, and provide transparency without hindering 
sensitive operations. These measures have to be substantive, not superficial. Measures 
such as public meetings, information brochures, a public website, etc., must include 
public involvement in the design of education and outreach process.   
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There is a paucity of data available on the full spectrum of the financial 
implications of creating a National Counterterrorism Network of regional RADAR 
centers. This knowledge gap is consistent for both the regional and national effort. We do 
not have good estimates of the major cost categories, such as capital, personnel or 
operating costs. Current Homeland Security funding for state and local government 
generally prohibits the use of funds for personnel or buildings. Consequently, the vast 
majority of existing collaborative counterterrorism efforts involves “donated” personnel 
and facilities with the more easily measured one-time grants being used for start-up and 
equipment costs. Personnel and facilities are the biggest costs of operating a 
counterterrorism center, but they remain hidden, other than to the agencies that donate 
them. 
Concomitantly, fiscal prudence dictates that we adopt a sustainment plan for the 
regional centers and national counterterrorism network. Presently, we are victimized by a 
system of grants and other short term funding. We need to identify a national funding 
plan that is consistent with the long-term nature of the terrorism threat we face.  
There is also a need to follow up on the work done by the Naval Postgraduate 
School and others in identifying the ideal composition of the potential regions.191 The 
geographic, demographic and resource diversity in America makes it impractical to have 
a “one size fits all” approach.  Much more research needs to be done to identify resource 
capacities, threat commonalities, and the like to either divide the country into ideal 
regions or unite them within the most effective structure. Likely, this will continue to be 
an experimental process in which regional “laboratories” will continue to provide 
empirical data for further research.  
Finally, there is much anecdotal evidence about waste in Homeland Security 
counterterrorism spending, but we lack metrics to evaluate how effectively the funds are 
                                                 
191 Discussion Draft, Thinking About National Preparedness, The National Planning Scenarios and 
Jurisdictional Own-source Capabilities, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate 
School. The essence of this work relates to finding common units of interest when assessing Homeland 
Security capability to place in clusters. 
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being spent. Further research in identifying measurement standards will help to compare 
the efficacy of different approaches and develop quality control programs.  Independent 
review teams, perhaps by an Inspector General’s office or GAO office, should be 
assigned to critically review the fusion centers to determine what is working and what 
needs to be improved. 
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X.  CONCLUSIONS 
All evolution in thought and conduct must at first appear as heresy and 
misconduct. 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
Homeland Security needs to be an evolutionary process, wherein America is 
continually adapting to a changing threat environment. As in biology, the process of 
natural selection drives evolutionary change. Natural selection is simply “survival and 
reproduction of the fittest,” in which individuals who are better adapted to a given set of 
environmental conditions have an advantage over those that are not as well adapted. The 
key, however, is to keep in mind that we are in an evolutionary race with terrorists. In a 
biological sense, evolutionary fitness refers to the ability to survive. In a Homeland 
Security sense, evolutionary fitness refers both to our ability to survive and to our ability 
to evolve faster than the terrorists — the ability to evolve faster because to evolve 
otherwise risks a pattern of suffering the lethal consequences of an attack before 
adapting; the ability to survive because the WMD threat makes this more than hyperbole.   
Natural processes of resistance to organizational change, coupled with a complex 
system of federal, state, tribal and local government inhibit innovation and the pace of 
change. For example, nearly six years after 9/11, we are still focused on and searching for 
a coherent way to share important information.  Moreover, while information fusion is 
critical, much more than just information needs to be fused.   
A review of the causes of the September 11 attacks on America highlight that we 
failed to prevent the attacks because there was a failure to fuse intelligence, investigations 
and operations. We thus lost their synergistic potential as a counterterrorism triad. There 
was an intelligence failure to effectively integrate and analyze disparate pieces of 
information stored in multiple locations and agencies in order to produce actionable 
intelligence. There was an investigative failure to effectively use our criminal 
investigative processes to prevent the attack, and there was an operational failure in that 
we neither interdicted the attackers nor responded effectively after the attack. 
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The primary cause of these three component failures was the lack of integration, 
not only among the triad components that would have produced the necessary synergy to 
have prevented the attack, but a similar lack of integration of other, non-federal, levels of 
government, non-law enforcement disciplines and other key stakeholders.  
Consequently, our nation should adopt a new view of what should constitute the 
appropriate framework for an “intelligence community,” and we have to have a 
corresponding change in how we perceive “national intelligence.”  This sea change in 
perception and organization is captured in the new National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) 
signed by President Bush in October 2005.192 The Strategy recognizes that national 
intelligence must be reworked to meet the needs of the 21st Century.  Towards that end, 
the Strategy calls for a unified enterprise of intelligence professionals that work in a 
collaborative manner.  It emphasizes the need for an integrated intelligence capacity that 
creates “an information sharing environment in which access to terrorism information is 
matched to the roles, responsibilities, and missions of all organizations engaged in 
countering terrorism, and is timely, accessible, and relevant to their needs.”  Finally, the 
NIS calls for the elimination of redundant programs and programs that bring little added 
value to national security.  
The current policy of promoting fusion centers and participation in Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces increases information sharing and integration; however, to the 
extent that we only fuse information or only the efforts of law enforcement, it is only a 
partial solution. This partial solution does not address the significant gaps that remain in 
our regional and national terrorism prevention and response capabilities.   
Our domestic counterterrorism efforts also remain hampered by the lack of an 
effective National Counterterrorism Network that fully integrates the Homeland’s 
entire intelligence assets and capabilities into one national counterterrorism system.  A 
national network is needed to eliminate the proliferation of well intentioned, but stove-
piped intelligence and Homeland Security entities. The failure to fully unify our domestic 
counterterrorism efforts is thwarting the creation of an efficient and effective national 
intelligence cycle, from identification of intelligence needs, to collection, to analysis and 
                                                 
192 The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America. 
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finally dissemination. This omission also severely limits our ability to take action to 
either prevent or more effectively respond to attacks and natural disasters. In summary, to 
the extent that our evolutionary processes stops at coordination and cooperation, but does 
not evolve to collaboration, we will not achieve the synergistic benefits of a more holistic 
organism. 
The most promising and effective solution to minimize gaps in our ability to 
protect the Homeland is to create a truly national network of key counterterrorism 
resources.  This National Counterterrorism Network should unite Regional and Super-
Regional All-Hazard, Disaster and Anti-terrorism Resource (RADAR) centers under the 
auspices of the existing National Counterterrorism Center for terrorism issues and the 
National Operations Center for “all-hazards” issues.  
 These regionally designed, but nationally networked and “accredited” RADAR 
centers would combine existing state, local, tribal and federal law enforcement 
intelligence, investigative and operational assets, along with the resources of key non-law 
enforcement government agencies and private sector groups, and the public, into one 
unified system dealing with “all-hazards” and “all-crimes” with national security 
implications. The resulting national network will not only minimize information sharing 
barriers, but will also ensure the most efficient and effective use of intelligence, 
investigative and operational resources.   
By being multi-disciplinary and multi-agency, these same resources would be 
able to collaborate to deal with not only deliberate, but also natural disasters as well.  
Because the proper partners for defeating terrorism are the same as those for dealing with 
other more common hazards, these “all-hazards” centers would achieve unparalleled 
efficiency in resource utilization and coordination, as well as information sharing.  
Finally, this collaborative effort must operate in a constitutionally sound manner 
that will promote the intertwining goals of public safety and civil liberties.  Erosion of 
privacy and civil liberties is not solely the concern of the extreme left or extreme right; 
respected groups and individuals across the political spectrum have espoused this 
concern. The debate has unfortunately all too often be framed as an “either/or” issue 
when these twin goals are not mutually exclusive. Creation of a National 
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Counterterrorism Network of RADAR centers that operate with reasonable 
transparency and oversight will earn public trust and support, and preserve liberty from 
both external and internal threats. 
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